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ABSTRACT
Throughout the history of the United States, its inhabitants have looked upon their nation
as a special place. In some cases, this has exceeded the natural and simple love of home and
country and taken a more extreme form. Important to this bent is the tendency to see the nation,
its beliefs, and its actions around the world as divinely sanctioned and inspired in some regard.
This is a generally necessary component to the idea of American Exceptionalism, which views
the United States as a nation with a divinely imposed mission to spread civilization, freedom,
and democracy to the ends of the earth.
In many ways, the Roman Empire shared these pretentions of being the bearers of
civilization to the rest of the world and of being a divinely chosen nation with that vocation.
Voices within Christianity, as it developed, provided a potent antithesis to this aspect of Roman
imperial ideology, critiquing Roman ideas of their own exceptionalism. By comparing the
ideological basis of Roman and American concepts of exceptionalism, this thesis will attempt to
apply the critique made by people like Jesus, Paul and Augustine to the United States today.
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INTRODUCTION
The idea of American Exceptionalism is an important one. If anyone doubted this before,
the simple anecdotal evidence of an election season can offer ample support of this proposition.
Politicians take extraordinary measures to appear the most patriotic, the most in tune with the
ideals of American democracy. Conventions and debates occur that would make one wonder
whether indeed the color spectrum extended beyond red, white and blue. Candidates give
speeches arguing not only that their opponent’s policies and ideals are not simply wrong,
irrational, or even immoral: the traditional realm of political discourse. Instead, one’s opponents
are un-American, out of step with an ideal conception of the nation seemingly shared by all.
As I will explain it, American Exceptionalism is the idea that America is a unique
country, possessing unique virtues and strengths that, due to its divinely given vocation, give it a
responsibility to spread those virtues to the rest of the world through militaristic means. The
roots of this idea go back to even the colonial period, as Americans have always thought of
themselves as a rather special people. These early examples, however, do not have either the
force or ideological backing that the idea would acquire in more modern history, yet throughout
the country’s history an expansionist impulse was present for which this idea provided the
impetus. For a great time this expansionist impulse was confined due to a capacity for selfcritique or simple geography, yet within the Twentieth century, and especially after end of the
Cold War, any theoretical way of slowing or stopping this militaristic expansion has been lost, as
without the counterbalancing Soviet influence, the American superpower has become more and
more a hegemonic empire.
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In this vision, American ideology and self-conception provided the basis for America’s
dealings with the rest of the world. These ideals are inherently religious concepts that have been
introduced into the realm of politics, whether God explicitly or implicitly provides the
justification. I will use Robert Bellah’s idea of an American civil religion and expand it to argue
for a religious conception of Americanism. This is, for Americans, a strange combination of the
remnants of Christian doctrine and Enlightenment political philosophy and of Puritanism and
Liberalism that becomes the civil religion. Secular America is then the sacred object of
veneration for every American.
Empires throughout the scope of history are rather common, and points of comparison
between the simple socio-economic politics of the United States in this day are rather easily
made. Rome looms large upon the horizon, however, as perhaps the greatest of all empires, and
if not that then certainly the ideal at which subsequent western ones aim. The reasons for this are
clear: it combined an incredible physical reach with astounding longevity, lasting in an
immediately recognizable form for a millennium, its immediate ancestor falling to the Ottomans
as late as the 1400s, and even maintaining some semblance of authority in the Vatican to this
day. Rome truly is the eternal city. The United States seems an obvious modern heir of this
ideal in pure worldwide power, though that power has not been tested as long as Rome’s. Yet it
also has a point of comparison that is perhaps unique: a religiously grounded exceptionalist ideal.
Rome, like America, saw itself as an exceptional place with a divinely appointed raison
d’être and vocation. The gods had provided the basis of Roman expansion, as her pious people
spread their way of life throughout the world, civilizing the barbarians and bringing the Roman
way of life to the Greeks. Such is the advice that Anchises gives the archetypical Roman Aeneas:
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But you, Roman, remember, rule with all your power
the peoples of the earth – these will be your arts:
to put your stamp on the works and ways of peace,
to spare the defeated, break the proud in war. (Virgil 210)
This is Rome’s wisdom and her calling. Under the same Augustus that Virgil wrote his epic
poem for was the pax Romana founded.
This same period of the pax Romana saw another figure spring into the historical
narrative: Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus brought his message of the kingdom of God in some form of
opposition to the kingdom that Caesar claimed, one based on a community of mutual love and
forgiveness and contrary to the Roman gospel built on envy and militaristic expansion. This
message was carried throughout the Mediterranean world by the most influential of the apostles
who would follow him: Paul. Through Paul’s efforts, Jesus’ message, previously confined to
Palestine, was spread throughout the eastern Roman Empire. Paul’s gospel proclaimed a new
way to be human – politically, morally, religiously – and was brought everywhere from Syrian
Antioch to Rome itself. This gospel, literally the euongalion or good news, was presented in
parallel ways to those issued by Roman emperors, creating a critique of the good news offered
by Rome. Paul set up in many important cities of the eastern empire new assemblies or ekklesiai
that maintained as their core message the lordship of a God who loved, suffered, and died to
conquer these worldly powers. This gospel was a great paradox, in that the true savior of the
world was not Caesar but Christ; that though he was defeated by those powers, in the same act he
triumphed over them, showing through his death and resurrection the facade that they were.
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For all this, however, it must be recognized that Christianity, as it developed through Paul
and eventually the Church Fathers, was not anarchistic. Though Pauline politics present a
radical critique of these worldly powers – seen in the particular instance of Rome – they do not
point to the end of all state power. Perhaps the greatest summation of the political ideal that
emerges from this is Augustine’s City of God, which explicitly acknowledges the legitimacy of
the state while maintaining Paul’s fundamental critique. In Augustine, the idea of the city of
God emerges explicitly, a sacred community that organizes itself on the same concepts of love
and forgiveness, and its oft contrary partner the city of man, based upon rivalry, envy, and vain
ambition.
This, I will show, is the original divide between the sacred and the secular. The two
cities represent two ultimately separate ways of organizing and conducting human affairs. The
flaw that Paul critiqued then in Rome was the confusing of these two ideas. This can be seen
most clearly in Rome’s idea of its own exceptionalism: that it was a unique people with a divine
calling that had a mission to spread their version of civilization to the world, that they were more
moral than other peoples, and eventually that their state and their sovereign emperor himself
were divine.
If a reasonable connection between Roman and American exceptionalist conceptions of
themselves can be made, then it is very reasonable to apply these same critiques of Paul and
Augustine to the United States today. Even more, however, the strange paradox must be
realized, that the Christian idea presented earlier in history to critique Rome is now being used in
a way to legitimate this Americanism in some extent from its founding to today.
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To sum up then: the intent of my thesis is to relate together the notions of Roman and
American exceptionalism by comparison, to seek out a political reading of Paul and the
philosophic expression of him in Augustine, and then to understand how this Christian tradition
that critiqued Rome does not serve the same purpose in the United States today. Ultimately I
will argue that Christianity, in succumbing to the ideology of the state in modern America, has
lost this distinctive element from its early history, and argue that it should be recovered.
METHODOLOGY
In order to do this, I have divided my work into three chapters, each examining the three
different voices that I am attempting to reconcile and understand. The first will be the foundation
of the work, laying out in as succinct a fashion as possible the Roman ideology that I seek to
critique. This is found in a number of sources, including primary ones like Virgil and Cicero.
The counterpoint to this I will then present in chapter two, where I provide the critique that the
New Testament writers and Augustine present. In large part, this has been derived from sources
engaged in the debate over the New Perspective on Paul, as I see that this scholarly trend has
recovered some of this part of the essential message of the Pauline epistles. In Augustine
however this is more philosophically displayed, and his work more readily conforms to the genre
of political philosophy.
Once these ancient sources have been dealt with I will proceed to my third chapter that
will seek to understand the American situation today. This will appear as a genealogy of the
idea, from its foundations in Puritanism and through the Revolution and Civil War to the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This must be a historical chapter, for the idea must be
traced historically, as I believe that, though present in earlier American history, the capacity to
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temper American Exceptionalism has been gradually lost, resulting in the predicament of today. I
shall then shortly give my opinion on what must be done in order to recover this capacity.
Ultimately I believe any call to action must be from the religious sphere and not the political, and
thus the way forward that I will point to centers around the role of the church, though it is
perhaps equally valid for peoples of all faiths. It is my belief that this is how any critique must
come, for it seems very unlikely that the political would suddenly become capable of critiquing
itself; critique must come from outside.
A word must be said of my own stance, however, before beginning. I freely admit that
realities are much more complicated and nuanced than my knowledge and experience can grasp,
and thus anything I see as problem or solution is provisional. Also, I write against Rome as one
who loves Rome, using the Aeneid in this manner though I believe it to be one of the greatest
poems of mankind, and one of my personal favorites. So too I write against this American
ideology as an American. I fear that this could easily be understood as a lack of patriotism or
gratitude for the freedoms experienced, but ultimately I must argue that this is not so. I wish
instead to display the same spirit as Chesterton, writing in his Defense of Patriotism:
My country, right or wrong,' is a thing that no patriot would think of saying except in a
desperate case. It is like saying, 'My mother, drunk or sober.' No doubt if a decent man's
mother took to drink he would share her troubles to the last; but to talk as if he would be
in a state of gay indifference as to whether his mother took to drink or not is certainly not
the language of men who know the great mystery. (166)
Love of country should be tied to love of land and neighbor, not idealized conceptions of a
popular sovereign who can do no wrong. Nations cannot exist autonomously and for their own

6

sake. When a nation relies on its people to upset their proper order of loves like this, taking over
the realm of the religious, it steps over a line, a line marked by what the Jews called idolatry and
the Greeks called hubris. It is against these things that I argue, for indeed it would seem that to
love a state improperly destroys that proper love of country called patriotism.
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CHAPTER 1: ROMAN IMPERIALISM
Roman imperialism was based on a number of foundational aspects both pragmatic and
ideological. Practical reasons included the various reasons for empire that many empires
throughout history have faced – the seemingly mundane reasons of defense and economy –
though in the Roman case these were included with unique emphases to the Roman context.
The more pertinent, however, are the ideological reasons that appear truly unique to Rome,
supported by her literature, philosophy, and political ideals. These ideals have been very
influential throughout history, though their particular realization may have proven difficult to
repeat.
PRACTICAL
There were many reasons for Roman expansion that could be seen as inherently practical.
These included the demands of defense, economic expansion, and the accumulation of glory for
the ruling elite. Though these are relatively common, and in some cases arguably benign
reasons, in Rome they found particular expressions that had profound consequences for the entire
Mediterranean world.
Economic drive was the simplest reason for Rome to expand. As the republic expanded
through Italy and into the rest of the known world, it acquired plunder from its wars, slaves, and
land to farm. All this was seen as necessary for the maintenance of the burgeoning empire itself,
but it was especially necessary for the display of power by the Patricians. This was, as one
scholar writes, “an expensive business at Rome.” He continues:
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Senators’ main holdings were in land, and that produced only a low percentage return on
capital. […] Regular shots of ‘windfall’ capital were required. In the Republic these
came in two ways: more or less corrupt provincial governorships, and booty from war
(including civil war in the last century BC). There had to be enough successful wars to
cater for the financial needs and desires of a host of competing senators, and the
superstructure of a handful of competing dynasts which was added in the last century BC.
[…] Greed, to put it bluntly, was a strong expansion-bearing structure in Republican
Rome. (Sidebottom 320-321)
These financial needs both bolstered the power of the elites, by adding to their prestige and
increasing the amount they could afford to give to those under them, bringing with them their
increased loyalty. Thus glory was something practical, which would be ascribed to individual
members of the elite – senators, equestrians, and later members of the imperial family.
This glory, however, also extended to the idea of the empire itself. Affronts to Roman
glory were easily felt, as uncouth barbarians or Greeks could readily supply. Such was the case
with the myriad of Rome’s consequent wars of expansion. As P. A. Brunt explains in reference
to Cicero’s political career:
Much of Cicero’s programme can have had no appeal to the poor either in Rome or in the
country, but the urban plebs at least could apparently be moved by the glamour of
imperial glory; in his speech for the Manilian law Cicero enlarges on the dishonour Rome
had suffered from the pirates and from Mithridates and on the necessity of entrusting the
eastern command to Pompey in order to restore ‘the prestige of the Roman people which
has been transmitted to you by our ancestors and whose greatness appears in every way
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and above all in the military domain’ No other people, he says there, had ever had such
an appetite for glory, and we know that in his own judgment this had been a dominant
motive for the old Romans. (163)
The masses of Rome had an unquenchable appetite for the glory that conquest could bring that
those in power were more than happy to attempt to sate.
Fear can be attributed as a cause for Roman expansion as well. This would have had a
great influence on the people at large. The memory of Hannibal in Italy would have loomed
large. Rich elaborates:
Why did senators so frequently judge that justice and the public interest required Rome to
embark on yet another war? […] The Romans’ possession of a magnificent fighting
machine, their habituation to war and their extraordinary record of success in it, the
benefits that success brought them and the continuing demand for more of the same that
it generated – it is these factors, above all, which made the Romans so ready to discern
and take up occasions for war. However, other factors played their part, and there is one
in particular which must not be neglected. The Romans were not always successful in
their wars and some enemies – the Gauls, Pyrrhus, Hannibal – threatened the very
survival of the Republic. Memories of those dangers were real enough, and in my
judgment the fear of powerful neighbors, although not, as used to be supposed, the key to
Roman imperialism, must remain an important factor in accounting for it. (61)
Even mighty empires are beset by occasional failure and enemies beyond their control. Such
was the case with Hannibal and the Gauls, whom on separate occasions the Romans failed to
keep out of Italy and out of easy reach of their capital. This ever-present threat could have been
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generically seen in the Germans across the Rhine or barbarians of the east, giving the elite an
easy recourse to war.
In this category as well can be placed the defense of the empire. Rome’s claims to an
empire built by defense – a defensive imperialism – are well known. Wars were waged to right
wrongs and remedy injustices, at least as the Romans saw them. Examples of this abound in
popular history. Rome saw fit to level Carthage and add North Africa to her empire because
Hannibal first attempted to in Italy. So too was it right for war to be brought to Epirus, after
Pyrrhus nearly brought the early Republic to her knees. To note that territory may be added to a
state’s holdings is a rather quotidian observation. Yet, when one uses the excuse as much as the
Romans did, it is easy to grow suspicious of motives. This suspicion naturally increases when
somehow an empire must take over the entire known world in order to defend herself. While the
concept of defensive imperialism has been subject to a great deal of scholarly debate in recent
years, even discredited by some scholars (Sidebottom 316), nonetheless, the concept is easy to
see in plain history.
IDEOLOGICAL
A developed ideology buttressed Roman use of power throughout the Mediterranean.
Whether the ideological components that supported the idea of Roman expansionism created the
expansionist impulse or simply sustained it is beside the point: by the late republic and the
emergence of the empire, Romans had good reasons to support their imperialist agenda. These
were contained in political philosophy supported by some of Rome’s greatest thinkers and
literary works by some of its greatest poets. In this too a concept of the ideological
underpinnings of emperor worship will be searched out, beginning in the more philosophic
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underpinnings of Virgil and Cicero, and culminating in the worship that actually occurred,
especially in the East and the city of Rome itself.
This is also the point of greatest importance for understanding the critique of empire
contained within this work. In using works like those of Cicero or Virgil, I seek an
understanding of the general attitude and ideology of Roman imperial power. This is the
backdrop to the critique that Christianity is capable of providing, not necessarily because Paul
had read Cicero or Virgil – the fact that they were originally written in the tongue of the Western
empire, Latin, rather than Greek would probably discount the possibility – but because the
general attitudes contained therein would have provided the self-understanding for many within
the empire, with whom Paul would have had dealings on a daily basis and written letters.
CICERO – DE RE PUBLICA
Perhaps chief among Roman politicians in the history books and in the literature that has
come down through the generations is Cicero. Cicero’s influence has been felt greatly
throughout history, and his influence during his day was not small by any means. Perhaps the
best summary of his ideal of the Roman state is found in his work De Re Publica. This work
was lost for sometime, only recently found again in the Vatican archives, and despite the work’s
consequent inability to reach the generations in between (including the founders of the United
States), it perhaps provides the best single volume overview of Cicero’s political ideology, and
provides a possible interesting point of contrast considering how Augustine draws from it in the
City of God.
Cicero presents his work in the form of a dialog between various Roman elites
concerning the constitution of the ideal state. This is a self-conscious effort to mimic Plato’s
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enduring work of the same name, yet in this case the effort is singularly different. Whereas
Plato’s work described an ideal that was in all probability unattainable and only an ideal, Cicero
locates the ideal state in history, namely in the Roman state itself: “Using our own government
as my pattern, I will fit to it, if I can, all I have to say about the ideal State” (107). For Cicero,
the ideal state is not something to be sought but something that has been achieved: in Rome,
civilization has arrived.
Throughout his entire work, Cicero’s De Re Publica serves to catalog the myriad
perfections of the Roman experiment, building on the thoughts of the ancient greats along the
way. Whereas Aristotle famously claimed that man was a political animal, Cicero builds, saying
of politics that “there is really no other occupation in which human virtue approaches more
closely the august function of the gods than in the founding of new States or preserving those
already in existence” (29). Politics, especially Roman politics then, is a divine action.
The power that Rome exerted around the world plays an important role as well, according
to Cicero. Few men, claims Cicero, are able to think of worldly goods in such disregard as they
are to be thought, and thus many esteem them too greatly and consequently rob and pillage their
neighbor. Yet this is where the Roman state steps in to rule the masses, as a wise man will
know, “that our military commands and consulships are to be classed among things necessary
rather than things desirable, and that they are to be undertaken from a sense of duty and not
sought for profit or glory” (49). Roman rule then enforces this “common law of Nature,” (49)
creating a world safe for man to inhabit, in seemingly Hobbesian fashion, preventing the war of
all against all. This is fit for the men in Cicero’s dialog to understand and assent to, as they all
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take part “in the administration of the greatest of all States” (63). Rome, according to Cicero, is
the end of the discussion on how people are to be governed. Rome is the end of politics.
In Cicero’s account, this is not simply because of the nature of the world at the time he
writes, but is indeed accounted for in particular methods with which Rome was itself founded.
The idea of Rome cannot be ascribed to one man in particular, such as a sovereign monarch,
Athenian lawgiver, or tyrant. Instead, the particular genius of Rome is found in the diversity of
its founding: Rome is the original e pluribus unum. As Cicero says: “Our own common wealth
was based upon the genius, not of one man but of many; it was founded, not in one generation,
but in a long period of several centuries and many ages of men” (113). Roman greatness is then
due to its ability to constantly change, as the state becomes a living thing.
Yet this is not to deny any special genius in the founders of Rome. Chief among these is
the legendary Romulus, seemingly wise and virtuous despite his sins of fratricide and abduction.
His choice for settling Rome was due to a “divine intimation,” so that Rome could be positioned
in a geologically advantaged manner. Rome was positioned in a way that it would not
experience the degeneracy of a strictly maritime city, as Corinth and Carthage, yet due to its
position close to the sea and commanding the Tiber, it could still gain all the economic benefit of
trade. Rome too, within a hilled portion of Italy and away from all the tumult of the east, was
easily defensible, a position from which to establish a secure empire (121, 117).
Romulus also sets the example for future Roman action. Romulus is the first to engage in
war for economic reasons, against the Latins for property and the Sabines for women: “he waged
many wars against his neighbors with the greatest good fortune, and, though he never brought
none [sic] of the booty to his own home, he never ceased enriching his people” (125). Romulus
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is the first of divine Roman rulers as well, as Cicero describes. This is due to his supposed
disappearance during an eclipse, which caused the people of Rome to surmise that “he had been
added to the number of the gods” – a “remarkable” feat, considering:
All other men who are said to become gods lived in ruder ages which there was a great
Inclination to the invention of fabulous tales […] but we know that Romulus lived less
than six hundred years ago, at a period when writing and education had long been in
existence, and all those mistaken primitive ideas which grew up under uncivilized
conditions had been done away with. (127)
Indeed, if the enlightened people of Romulus’s day could ascribe divine honors to him, what
then would prevent those living shortly after Cicero from ascribing the same to Julius Caesar’s
nephew?
Cicero maintains, however, no fault with Romulus. To be sure, he closes his account of
Romulus with ringing praise. Romulus “implanted [in the Roman people] a love for peace and
tranquility, which enable justice and good faith to flourish most easily, and under whose
protection the cultivation of the land and the enjoyment of its products are most secure” (135).
Besides this, Romulus provided the example of Roman religious piety, creating the particular
way in which all Romans could worship the gods in a manner which would demand attention but
not great resources: “Thus he made the performance of religious duties laborious but not costly”
(135). Romulus, in spite of all that is known of him, appears as a form of the ideal Roman. He,
like Rome itself, is peace loving, pious, and devout, in spite of any actual evidence to the
contrary.
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Cicero then presents in the words of political discourse a picture of a Rome that is
important to understand. In De Re Publica, a glimpse is gained of important precedents for the
late Republic and the Empire that was beginning to emerge. This was a state that, in its
republican guise, provided the ideal of a state, and though the empire would have been a
degeneration of that idea for Cicero, the same ideal could be carried forward under Augustus. It
seems that Cicero, as an archetypical Roman politician, sees it an impossible task to improve on
the Roman political system. Rome in its founding and actualization appears as the end of a
political discourse that had been occurring for hundreds of years, through figures like Plato,
Aristotle, and Thucydides. With Rome, the work of politics is finished, and only bureaucratic
managing and governing remains. With Rome, history has reached its end.
VIRGIL - AENEID
What Cicero’s work is to politics, Virgil’s Aeneid is to literature, though more so.
Virgil’s great epic, detailing the escape of Aeneas from Troy put to torch by Agamemnon’s
Greeks, tells the founding story of Rome, before even the mythologized Romulus and Remus.
Aeneas is the ideal, first Roman, possessing in abounding measure the virtues that Romans
praised, and possessing himself the divine vocation that Romans felt, virtues and callings that
naturally would have been imputed to the Roman people as well. Through all Aeneas’ travels,
Virgil presents an apology for Roman imperialism in a particularly beautiful manner. Aeneas
represents most clearly the civilizing mission to which the Romans felt themselves called.
The work itself begins atop Mount Olympus, where Venus is worried about the rage of
Juno that has toppled Troy, afraid that the Trojans and her beloved son Aeneas will forever
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perish from the earth. Jupiter reassures her, delivering the first of many prophesies concerning
the greatness of Aeneas’ line and his eventual revenge on the treacherous Greeks:
This is my pleasure, my decree. Indeed, an age will come,
as the long years slip by, when Assaracus’ royal house
will quell Achilles’ homeland, brilliant Mycenae too,
and enslave their people, rule defeated Argos.
From that noble blood will arise a Trojan Caesar,
his empire bound by the Ocean, his glory by the stars[.
…]
And you, in years to come, will welcome him to the skies,
you rest assured – laden with plunder of the East,
and he will Aeneas will be invoked in prayer.
Then will the violent centuries, battles set aside,
grow gentle, kind. […] (57)
Here Virgil places many of the themes that will be expounded in his work in the mouth of
Jupiter, and gives causus belli for many of the wars that will be fought against the east. In the
case of wars against the Greeks in the Peloponnesus and Asia Minor, Roman violence can be
justified as just retribution against treacherous Greeks for the sack of Troy. Jupiter prophesizes
too that this action will also bring divine recognition to Aeneas’ line, culminating in Julius
Caesar and Octavian, who will finally bring an everlasting peace to the world.
The treachery of the Greeks is displayed foremost in the person of Achilles and the
actions of those who sacked Troy itself. Achilles’ rage is infamous, the main topic that Homer
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invoked the Muse to sing upon at the beginning of his Iliad. Yet even Achilles is appealed to as
an example of virtue by Priam when a soldier comes to slaughter the king of Troy on an altar:
“Achilles/ never treated his enemy Priam so. No, He honored/ a suppliant’s rights, he blushed to
betray my trust, / he restored my Hector’s bloodless corpse for burial, / sent me safely home to
the land I rule!” This is Priam’s supplication to the Greek soldier – Pyrrhus, in a peculiar
foreshadowing of the future harasser of Italy – before he slays Priam on the shrine, perhaps a
shadow of barbarous human sacrifice (Virgil 93).
This is the nature of the Greeks, a comparatively civilized people compared to the
barbarians of further north in the Roman mindset. Yet even their barbarity provides a reason for
rational, virtuous Romans to rule over them. This is the calling delivered to Aeneas and all
Romans by Anchises: “But you Roman, remember, rule with all your power / the peoples of the
earth – these will be your arts: / to put your stamp on the works and ways of peace, / to spare the
defeated, break the proud in war” (210). This itself is curiously close to something recorded of
God, who it is said “opposes the proud and gives grace to the humble” (James 4:6; 1 Peter 5:5
ESV), a connection that Augustine will make.
That Rome is to be a moderating, virtuous influence on the rest of the world is seen over
and over again in Virgil’s epic. In the person of Aeneas himself the reason for this is Aeneas’ –
and thus Rome’s – virtue. Aeneas’ calling to rule the world is just because Aeneas is a just man,
QED.

This is seen foremost in his dealings with Dido, when he gives up her love and rule of

Carthage for his calling:
But Aeneas
is driven by duty now. Strongly as he longs
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to ease and allay her sorrow, speak to her,
turn away her anguish with reassurance, still,
moaning deeply, heart shattered by his great love,
in spite of all he obeys the gods’ commands,
and back he goes to his ships. (141)
Aeneas resists the temptation that love offers, even prompting the exclamation from Virgil of
“Love, you tyrant! / To what extremes won’t you compel our hearts?” (142), for the calling that
the gods and fates placed before him. Aeneas is stoic and pious towards the gods and the
memory of his ancestors, not a victim of uncontrollable eros like Dido, Achilles, and the later
example of Turnus, the legitimate heir of the Latin kingdom which Aeneas claims. Turnus is
driven by his “hot fury” and “mad lust for carnage,” even claiming to be the reincarnation of
Achilles himself (291, 290). In the face of these extremes, Aeneas must rule – all that is moral
demands it.
All these elements would simply provide an interesting story told in the beautiful verse of
Virgil, if not given the real world consequences. For those who may not see what is concealed in
Virgil’s poetry, he provides the meaning of what he is talking about explicitly in multiple cases,
providing up front explanations for the legitimacy of Roman rule in the first century and the
legitimacy of its new emperors. Specifically, this takes place in the praise of Augustus, Virgil’s
patron, throughout the work. One of these occurs from the mouth of Anchises, again in Aeneas’
voyage to the underworld. Anchises prophesies that Caesar Augustus “Son of a god, he will
bring back the Age of Gold” (208). Besides providing divine status for Augustus, Virgil claims
that he has reversed the course of history itself, returning the world to its first, golden age – as
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recorded by Hesiod and later Ovid. Augustus’ rule has returned the world to a time before the
fall. It is hard to avoid the association that Augustus’ rule has then brought about the end of
history.
Indeed, this is the role that Rome itself plays, in a section whose resemblance to JudeoChristian eschatological literature is difficult to ignore. Here, in Virgil’s account of the shield
forged by the god Vulcan for Aeneas, is found Rome, seemingly the capital of the world. Caesar
sits enthroned as he “reviews the gifts brought on by the nations of the earth / and he mounts
them high on the lofty temple doors / as the vanquished people move in a long file, / their dress,
their arms as motley as their tongues” (265). Virgil then proceeds to provide a list of those who
will bring their riches to Rome, a list that encompasses the farthest corners of the earth. To use a
different idiom: Caesar sits high and enthroned among the cherubim, as the kings of the world
bring all their riches to him in supplication, he who not only unites them in a seeming political
association but unites their motley tongues, maintaining a new tongue for the entire world to
speak, reversing their confusion and political disunity.
Virgil provides perhaps the greatest example of Roman imperial pride and is perhaps the
empire’s greatest apologist. While it is easy to find sections of the book that are objectionable in
view of this critique, it is very easy to get swept away in the grandeur of the verse and the empire
itself. This is indeed a great struggle, for, in reading Virgil, one gains the sense that not all is
wrong with his imperial picture, that indeed there is something very right with it, if only the
hubris, pride, and avarice of the Romans could be accounted for.

20

IMPERIAL CULT – WEST AND EAST
With the sense of Roman pride that was so common in the late republic, the emergence of
a sole individual upon whom all that glory and pride could be focused would prove to have
interesting consequences. Cicero, for all his praise of Julius Caesar, could hardly have been
expected to heap divine honors upon a single man. Virgil provides the basis, making Augustus a
very great man indeed, but at most it would seem only a demigod, the son of a god – something
equivalent to a Hercules or Aeneas himself.
The advent of the imperial cult appears then, for the Romans at least, to be a true
innovation. The precedent for this is set in remembrance of Julius Caesar and Augustus after
their deaths, as Tacitus records that after Augustus’ death he was deified along with “Divine
Julius,” in a ceremony that included prayers to the new leader of the empire Tiberius. The
situation surrounding the ascension of Tiberius and the funerary remembrance of Augustus is
said, in the particular rational melancholy so typical of Tacitus, to have revolutionized the state
(8-10, 5).
Yet for all the divine honors heaped upon the first two lifelong dictators of the decaying
empire, Augustus’ sense of self-importance, and the important of his own office, surely serve the
purpose of puffing up his subjects’ opinions of him. Besides the pomp of assuming a name such
as Augustus, literally the august or majestic one, a good written example of this is the Deeds of
the Divine Augustus, published in the year of his death, CE 14. Here Augustus gives an account
of his actions throughout his long reign, where in “he subjected the whole wide earth to the rule
of the Roman people,” acting as dictator, yet still operating under the auspices of republican
popular sovereignty.
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Augustus records his actions that “set free the state” and increased over and again the
scope of Roman rule. He describes his power over these “foreign nations,” deciding in the wake
of the civil war between him and Antony which he “was able to safely forgive” rather “than to
destroy.” He maintains his great piety, claiming, “I restored many traditions of the ancestors,
which were falling into disuse in our age, and [I myself] handed on precedents of many things to
be imitated in later generations.” He records his great contributions to the plebs and the state,
feeding the hungry when needed and making up for deficits when tax income did not prove
sufficient. He does all of this, bringing peace to the state full of discord, so that the Senate even
proclaims upon him the title “Father of the country.”
Yet Augustus’ greatest claim to glory is what he did in the wider world. Augustus records
that he “restored peace to the sea from the pirates,” making safe common body of water which
all men shared and thus making the world safe for trade. He “extended the borders of all the
provinces of the Roman people,” and brought peace back to those provinces full of discord, like
Gaul and Spain. Through his skill in diplomacy and war, he “added Egypt to the rule of the
Roman people,” and placed garrisons in military colonies in “Africa, Sicily, Macedonia, […]
Spain, Greece, Asia, Syria, Narbonian Gaul, and Pisidia” and established military garrisons
throughout Italy herself. Augustus brought peace to the entire civilized earth, bringing about the
famous pax Romana. And in gratitude for all this, supplications are sent from the kings of the
ends of the earth, including the kings of the Parthians, Medes, and Britons – kings outside the
prevue of Roman control, but who would have to deal with Roman might in the years to come.
For all of these things, the Senate gave Augustus honor upon honor, giving him the title
of Augustus. He records that they “publicly clothed with a laurel and a civic crown” the doors of
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his temple – without any hint that it might be strange for him to have a temple. Besides this, the
Senate inscribed these acts themselves on two bronze pillars, and set before his temple a golden
shield “testif[ying] to the virtue, mercy, justice, and piety for which the senate and Roman people
gave it to me.” Whatever the actualities of Augustus’ rule – and he surely was a great man, as
history has recorded – it is rather easy to see that an elevation of the man and his office was in
the works as soon as the end of his reign. After his death, this elevation to even greater heights
could easily continue.
Indeed, this would be the case, especially in the eastern empire, which had a longer
tradition of elevating its rulers to divine status. Such was the long tradition of rulers of the
ancient near east: the divinity ascribed to the pharaohs or rulers of Babylon is well known. So
too is the elevation of Alexander after his conquest of the east, as he brought back conceptions of
a divine ruler to the rational politics of the Greeks. Hellenism was, in many ways, a two way
street, and as Greek philosophy and art filtered into the east’s conquered lands, some political
ideals could surely have filtered back, an idea readily present in even Roman histories of the
Hellenistic period, like Arian’s biography of Alexander.
So too could the Greeks have been ready for a ruler who was something more than the
rulers they experienced. At the time Greece came under Roman control, in the middle to late
second century BCE, it had been wracked by internal conflict stretching back to the end of the
Persian Wars, was humiliated by the overwhelming force of Alexander’s Macedonian phalanxes,
and saw resplendent Corinth utterly destroyed by Roman might. The golden age of philosophy
and politics was long over: the Greeks, it would seem, were relatively prepared to accept a ruler
who would simply bring peace. Such is the observation that the ability to deify rulers appeared
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with the disappearance of the polis: “Ruler cult arose in the Greek world with the imposition of
monarchy over the flourishing and proudly autonomous Greek city” (Price, “Between Man and
God” 39). Something otherworldly was needed to explain the inability of the Greeks to rule
themselves rationally and democratically it would seem.
Roman religion had always been a grand display of syncretism and what Charles King
calls “polymorphism” (245). In this age after Christendom, where religion is still somewhat
bound to more absolutist conceptions of Christian dogma, it becomes somewhat difficult to
properly understand religion in these terms (though throughout this work it will hopefully
become apparent that our situation is closer to their situation than many conceive). The Christian
community from its inception defined itself against outsiders by dogmatic statements such as
“‘Jesus is the son of God’ [… which] is a Christian dogma because it is a belief essential to
membership in the category ‘Christian’” (283). Thus the concept of orthodoxy, literally right
belief, while foreign to Roman ears, becomes essential to Christian self identity, and becomes
something that Christendom would pass down to its Enlightenment heirs.
The Romans, however, operated on a different system when encountering foreign
peoples. While not known as the kindest and gentlest peoples to walk the earth, Romans would
never force their polytheistic religious views on the conquered peoples. As King explains:
When the Romans encountered foreign peoples, they likewise did not erect firm barriers
between their gods and beliefs and those they encountered elsewhere. If anything,
Roman religious history is the history of assimilating and adapting the religious concepts
of their neighbors. Romans frequently worshipped local gods when they entered foreign
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areas, identified Roman gods with the gods of other peoples, and imported the worship of
certain outside cults to Rome. (285)
This is most certainly the case throughout history, especially with the gods of the east. Roman
conceptions of their own gods were open to change, and their pantheon could expand and
contract as needed. Such was the case so that in the later empire an imported gods from Persia
like Mithras and Sol Invictus would become deities more important even than the Olympians in
the West.
This rule was not without exceptions. The Jews provide the most startling contrast to
this, because their monotheism could not be reconciled with a state that demanded absolute
loyalty. This is peculiar to Jewish history, for though Jews had prospered under foreign empires
before, mass revolts only seem to have happened with rulers who could not tolerate the challenge
that Jewish monotheism provided, such as the infamous example of Antiochus Epiphanes, the
powerful ruler of the Seleucids who defiled the temple in order to punish rebellious Jews,
creating the opportunity of remembering Hanukah.
Thus, Jewish resistance to Roman rule should come as some surprise to one who would
think that the Romans were simple polytheists like their Greek progenitors. Indeed, popular
history tells us that this was not the case, as Pompey famously walked into the Holy of Holies
unscathed and Caligula did his best to erect a statue of himself in the same place years later. The
Jewish mindset proved a stumbling block to something within Roman ideology, and that seems
to be focused in the necessity that Roman subjects provide their first loyalty to the state and its
maintenance, something that would have proved difficult for Jewish monotheism.
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The most egregious example of this Roman mindset can be found in the imperial cult that
sprung up in the east, especially in the years following the death of Augustus. In many cases,
cults to the emperor would spring up aside more traditional religions, where in a worship
ceremony “libations or ritual cakes” were laid out, with animal sacrifice at larger, public
ceremonies (Price, “Between Man and God” 29). Temples to Augustus, as the office of emperor
was termed, were widely built in the eastern emperor, along with “widely attested” to “priests of
the emperor” (31). Greek and Roman ways of viewing the divinity of the emperor were
somewhat divided. Whereas the Romans attributed much of the imperial glory and pomp to the
office itself, the Greeks directed their worship toward the emperor who was holding the office
(34). This seems to have continued something that had become popular in the Greek world after
the Hellenistic period, when even the Athenians began to refer to their rulers as soteres – saviors
– a word that would come to have some great deal of significance in the Christian era (38).
Besides sōter, other linguistic terms emerged in the Greek world which are of interest in a
comparison. Whereas we have already seen the emperor refered to as divi filius – son of a god –
in Virgil, a similar term theou huios emerged n the Greek world. The emperor would both be
referred to as theou huious – son of god – and as simple theos in the Greek system (Price, “Gods
and Emperors” 79). This does not seem uncommon or even unnatural for the Greeks of this
period. Indeed, human manifestations of the divine were common in Greek mythology, as
anyone with a cursory knowledge of the subject will know of Zeus’ frequent earthly exploits
(87). What seems to be important to realize is the capacity to recognize a human being as an
actual member of the divine pantheon was already present within the Greek cosmological
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system, something that would come into conflict with the Christianity that Paul would seek to
spread throughout the Mediterranean.
CONCLUSION
In this argument, various particularities of Roman imperialism in its practical and more
ideological components have been laid out. Roman empire was a simple state of affairs within
the Mediterranean world, as Roman power spread from Italy into the far reaches of the known
world. This was accompanied by standard reasons for empire: greed, envy, pride and the like, as
well as the day-to-day necessities of maintaining an imperial power. When one has a great deal
to lose one has a great deal to fear, and Roman fear produced a great motivation for conquest of
neighbor.
What legitimated power for Rome was its theoretical underpinning. These can be seen in
the political writings of Cicero, who makes the claim that Rome was the best of all states,
thereby seemingly ending the discussion of politics, as the ideal that Aristotle and the like were
looking for came to fruition in Rome. This is found too in the work of Virgil, who displays the
glory and pomp of Rome, and provides some theological basis for Roman empire. Rome’s
empire spread because it was the will of the gods and fates; Rome is called to empire, and her
virtues attest to this calling and provide justification for it.
This culminates in a civic religion that in the west is seen in the example of the
deification of the office of emperor and the state itself. Augustus provides the paradigm of this,
as the contemporary incarnation of Aeneas and the idea Rome itself, bringing peace to the entire
earth and glory to the emperor. To combine this with the eastern ideology of rulers seems to
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result in a strong imperial cult in Greece and Asia Minor, complete with worship and sacrifice of
the emperor.
This then is the world that the Apostle Paul finds himself in as he goes throughout the
cities of Greece and Asia Minor. Famously converted from Judaism on the Damascus Road,
Paul the former Pharisee becomes Christianity’s most prominent missionary, and it would seem
almost singlehandedly brings about the evangelization of important cities throughout the Eastern
Empire, and even reaches Rome itself toward the end of his life. This is the world that the
Apostle inhabited, and the one that, perhaps, he argues against in his letters.
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CHAPTER 2: CHRISTIAN CRITIQUE
Christianity, as it developed, provided a potent critique to the ideology and power of
Rome. Triumphant Christianity would point back to Apostle Paul as its progenitor, who traveled
throughout the Mediterranean world, especially that of the eastern Roman Empire, preaching,
teaching, and writing his famous epistles to churches he visited or intended to visit. The Pauline
element is essential to Christianity as it came to be known in the fourth century, as orthodoxy
was consolidated, and essential to the definition of the religion even until today.
Whereas Paul articulated his doctrine from a place alternatively of duress or obscurity,
Augustine developed much of Paul’s thought from a place of prominence and security.
Augustine’s City of God brings to fruition a fully developed Christian politics in the first era
where Christianity was able to flex its political muscle from a place of official power and not
from subversion. Augustine’s narrative of the two cities, founded at the foundation of the world
and providing a hermeneutic with which to understand history, serves to offer a place from
which Roman imperial pride can be critiqued philosophically, and gives an alternative founded
on something approaching a Christian type of secularism.
BACKGROUND
Neither Paul nor Augustine write from a vacuum politically or theologically. The
Christian tradition finds its foundation in the gospel accounts of Jesus and the writings of the Old
Testament. Throughout the Old Testament, the story is told of Jewish dealings with greater
powers, which in turn would subjugate, release, and subjugate the Jewish peoples – out of Egypt
and into Babylon over and again. A way to understanding this strange place and relation of the
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Jews is provided in Genesis, where this relationship is explained in the first generations of
mankind, in the persons of Cain and Abel and their progeny.
OLD TESTAMENT COSMOLOGY
The Jewish people have perhaps more experience than any other living under empire.
The very notion of Judaism in a medieval and modern context would seem to necessitate living
in diaspora, as the way of life tied to the nation of Israel shifts to a Rabbinic religion after 70CE.
From the destruction of Jerusalem under the Romans in the first century CE until the founding of
the modern nation-state of Israel in the early twentieth century, there was no present political
entity to which Jews could point as home.
These two thousand years could not even be pointed to as something revolutionary. The
whole of Jewish history is surrounded by narratives of exile and captivity, with which any Jews
in the first century would have been readily familiar. These include the well known journey to
later slavery in Egypt, the capture and exile of the divided kingdoms by the Assyrian and
Babylonian Empires, the return to the land under the Persian Cyrus, and the myriad dealings with
Seleucids and Romans in the second temple period.
It is not surprising then that these hardships would be reflected in the literature of the
nation, the law, history, and prophets, collectively known to Christians in the West as the Old
Testament. Dealing with empire and the various attempts at it begins to be dealt with even as
early as the Genesis account. Immediately following expulsion from the Garden, Genesis
recounts the story of the first two brothers, Cain and Abel. The story is well known to many, but
in it Genesis recounts history’s first fratricide, born of the envy that Cain felt toward his brother
after his sacrifice was rejected by God. God places a curse on him and condemns him to wander
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the earth, a command that Cain will flout, going off to build a city for him and his descendants
(Genesis 4). This city will serve as the archetypical antithesis to the community that Israel sought
to see itself as, as heirs of God’s covenants, and proves the foundation of what Augustine will
call the city of man. This is the prototypical empire, built on vice of envy, envy that results in
fratricide.
The other foundational aspect of this dichotomy is given shortly after in the story of the
Tower of Babel. The story of Babel and its apparent cognate Babylon (whether real or
imagined) becomes crucial to the history of Israel and the reworking of it made by Paul in the
first century. In the account, the descendants of Noah, the generation descended from those who
survived the worldwide flood, assemble themselves to create a great tower in order to make a
great name for themselves so that they will not be scattered across the face of the earth. In order
to frustrate these attempts, the story recounts that God descends from heaven and scatters them
across the face of the earth, creating the division of languages commonly experienced even today
and the diffusion of the human race across the earth (Genesis 11). Here we see another of the
imperial ideologies that will be so important to empire. This is something like pride or what the
Greeks commonly called hubris, which will become, in the parlance of the Hebrew Scriptures,
idolatry, at least of a political sort. Just as the Greeks saw this sentiment’s eventual destruction
by Nemesis, the Genesis account gives a Hebraic account of the same type of phenomenon.
While the history of the Jewish people provides example upon example of the interaction
between their elect nation and the gentile empires, to begin in Genesis provides an ideological
underpinning to the history that will be told. The kings, prophets, and priests of Israel’s history
were certainly on the minds of the first century writers, but to recount their history here would
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prove impossible. Yet the presence of these ideas early in Jewish self-understanding can allow
us here to jump forward to their eventual confrontation with Rome in the first century.
JESUS AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD
Out of this context and within the more specific context of Second Temple Judaism came
Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus reinterprets and reapplies the critique of empire expressed throughout
the Old Testament within his context of the day, namely that of a Judaism operating under the
governance of Rome’s far reaching empire. This part of Jesus’ message can be seen throughout
all of the gospel writers’ accounts in various examples, but can be seen most strongly perhaps in
the Sermon on the Mount.
The Sermon on the Mount is essential to the Matthean account of Jesus’ ministry and
teaching. In it, Jesus pronounces an ethic based upon the Mosaic Law that intensifies it. Jesus
cuts to the core of the prohibitions contained in the law, specifically the Ten Commandments, by
prohibiting the underlying desire behind the illicit action. Besides the various prohibitions that
undercut the reigning social system of Rome, Jesus provides the basis of the new community that
he calls the kingdom of God.
The sermon begins with the famous Beatitudes, and proceeds to describe a way of life
antithetical to any imperial grandiosity. The Beatitudes tell that the those who are blessed are
not those who take and strive in greedy ambition, but rather those what are “poor in spirit,”
meek, and “hunger and thirst for righteousness” (5:3, 5, 6). Jesus then proceeds to prohibit not
only the actions that the law prohibits, but also the desires that lead to them. Thus he expands
the prohibition against murder, making it include anyone who is angry or insults his brother
(5:22), cutting off the immoral action at the source. The new kingdom of God will not
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experience the hatred that leads to homicidal strife, as in the archetypical examples of Cain and
Abel and Romulus and Remus. Jesus, as Rene Girard would say, cuts off the power of the
founding murder. This is not to say that the kingdom of God Jesus establishes is free of some
sort of foundational murder, and thus completely heavenly and not at all possessing temporal
authority.
Before the act of violence that establishes Jesus’ new community, however, it is
important to look at the various ways in which Jesus does take some aim at Rome itself. Rome
was not something that could be ignored in the late second temple period, and Jesus probably
would have experienced or known of some Roman brutality in his upbringing, as John Dominic
Crossan points out (109-10). Ultimately though, Jesus does not take the side of more zealous
anti-Rome groups acting within Judea at the time, like the violent zealots or the isolationist
Essenes. Jesus’ critique is pointed toward the Sadducees in some respects, the upper class group
that had most directly allied itself with Rome, but also pointed toward the more moderate
Pharisees. Jesus seems to be concerned with any group that may be comfortable with the powers
of the world: in some cases Rome itself, but in many more cases the powers that Rome
represents.
An example of Jesus’ Roman critique is evident in the well-known story of the denarius,
found in Mark 12:13-17. In it, the Pharisees attempt to trap Jesus by posing the question of
whether they are to pay taxes to Caesar. If Jesus answers the question wrongly, he can expect
problems with the Roman authorities. Yet Jesus famously holds up a denarius and proclaims the
dictum that one should render unto Caesar what is Caesars and render unto God what is God’s,
thus escaping the Pharisees’ trap for another day.
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Two things reveal themselves upon further inspection. The first of these is a fact that
would have been known by Mark’s audience, but not by us today. Though the story tells that
Caesar’s image was upon the coin, it does not inform the text that appeared on it, namely, as
Martin Rist explains, “TI CAESAR DIVI AUG FILIUS AUGUSTUS,” namely Tiberius Caesar, Divine
Augustus, son of Augustus (317). All talk of the imperial cult aside, what Jesus provides is a
fundamental rejection of Caesar’s presence in the category of God. This does not somehow
provide for some separate realm of secular economics, as one might imagine. Jesus
fundamentally undermines the emperor’s claim, and inserts his own criticism of that realm over
which Caesar claims sovereignty. In the language of later political philosophy, he establishes a
sacred/secular divide, but then proceeds to critique the secular from his position within the
sacred. The two are distinct, but not completely walled off from each other.
The other thing that the story exposes is the fundamental critique of the Pharisees present
in Jesus’ message. This is a critique based upon collusion that occurs between the Pharisees and
Rome (see Crossan 132). While this alliance is not explicit in any of the Pharisees’ action in the
narrative, except for the trial and crucifixion itself, Jesus hones in during his ministry on an
ideological based complicity. Fundamentally, Jesus identifies the Pharisees as children, not of
Abraham but of Satan. This appears most explicitly in John’s gospel, where the Pharisees
seemingly put Jesus on trial (8:39-47).
This appears to be a fundamental mission of Jesus’ ministry. As a part of bringing his
kingdom of God to earth, he seeks to unmask the powers of the world. The alliance between
Rome and the Pharisees need not be a political one; according to Jesus they have the same father:
Satan. This is something that Rene Girard explains:
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Though not identical with Satan, the powers are all his tributaries because they are all
servants of the false gods that are the offspring of Satan, that is, the offspring of the
founding murder. So here it is not a matter of religion for the individual or belief in a
purely individual sense, as modern people tend to hold. What we are talking about here
are rather the social phenomena that the founding murder created. (96)
Jesus’ kingdom is one that rejects this violent contagion present within the various kingdoms of
the world, one based on the different ethic found within the Sermon on the Mount, and
exemplified throughout Jesus’ ministry.
Ultimately though, even the kingdom that Jesus aims to bring cannot but be established
through some murder. Within the gospel accounts, the leaders of Israel, with special attention
given to the Pharisees, bring Jesus before the magistrate to be tried. This should not be cause for
anti-Semitism in the least, as has commonly been the charge, but instead is endemic of the
collaboration between the two parties, reflective of their common antipathy toward Jesus and his
kingdom. Though Jesus’ death on the cross is a murder, none involved are more or less guilty of
his death than any other of parties. Jesus’ death serves, according to the collective witness of the
New Testament writers, as a fundamental unmasking of the powers and principalities of the
world, intent upon working their will though violent means.
Though Jesus does not take violent measures against the state, as indeed he could have
given the presents of the Zealot faction within Roman Palestine, he fundamentally calls into
question the authority and autonomy of the state through his ministry and shameful death.
Simultaneously, he lays the foundation for a new community based upon an entirely new ethical
system than the kingdoms of the world could have imagined. The shame of mankind that he
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bears on the cross serves to open mankind up to renewed source of desire, not rooted in the
foundational envious fratricide of Cain and Abel, and thus in line with the actions of the satan,
literally the accuser. The new community will instead be based on gracious participation with
the Spirit, in Greek the parakletos, or advocate. These ideas will be elaborated upon greatly by
Paul.
PAULINE CRITIQUE
Paul, as a religious figure, is one of the most influential of history. By many popular
accounts he invented Christianity, creating a religion from the spiritual teachings of the itinerant
teacher Jesus. Many who see things in this manner will echo the sentiments of a Newsweek
article that John Dominic Crossan quotes from as an example of anti-Paul fervor – claiming that
Paul was “pro-slavery, anti-Semitic, misogynistic, and homophobic” (143). Whether these
charges are true or not is imminently debatable, as it is hard to believe that a man whose letters
were constantly begun with the phrase “grace and peace” would be able to sustain that kind of
hypocrisy. Nevertheless, it is possible for many to see Paul as the anti-Jesus apostle, the one that
turned the Jesus Movement into Christianity, and brought with it all the baggage that moderns
find contemptible.
Others see Paul as the great apostle of justification by faith alone, a major theme of the
Protestant Reformation, particularly from the ever anxious and guilt-ridden Martin Luther. This
is, in many cases, the Paul devoid of historical and cultural context, and the one perhaps most
prevalent in American evangelicalism. This is sometimes the Paul of a somewhat gnostic, solely
heavenly salvation, the one that has little if anything to say about the political and social beyond
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the morality of an individual’s life: the Paul who seems equally ambivalent about the Rome that
surrounds him and the Israel in which he was raised.
Both Pauls should, to some degree or another, be rejected as at the very least overly
simplistic. Paul was not out of line with Jesus’ essential message or with his preached Kingdom
of God. Instead, Paul carried this message forward, bringing the idea of the Kingdom of God
into its full fruition in the ekklesia of his epistles, and bringing that idea into direct conflict with
Rome’s conceptions of its role in the world and in history. Equally so, I will argue here that Paul
did not simply concern himself with the individual morality of the individual believer, but
brought forth the idea (and, in many cases, the practice) of a profound new ethical community,
organized as a competitor and antithesis to the practices of the world he lived in.
THE MODERN QUEST FOR PAUL
Modern Pauline scholarship has taken up the question of Paul’s context with a great deal
of excitement. To understand Paul in his context is en vogue in contemporary scholarship,
whatever context one would look to understand him in. One could be looking for post-colonial
interpretations that explain Paul with respect to his imperial context using the tools of the
postmodern world. Another could look to a Paul drawn to carefully fit within his world as a First
Century Jew and his setting as a member of Second Temple Judaism in a new perspective.
Perhaps one could look to a Paul that is classically educated, familiar with the political structures
of Aristotle and Hellenism, and seeking to contribute to that discussion like a Renaissance
prince. All of these Pauls have something important to say to our modern understanding of the
man and are, to various extents, essential to my work here.
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PAUL AND EMPIRE
Paul carries forward the critique lived out by Jesus that the gospels account in a different
manner. Paul travels throughout the eastern Roman Empire visiting important cities and
attempting to begin new churches in these cities. All the while, however, Paul provides a potent
ideological underpinning in his numerous epistles that he sends to these churches. By his
actions, Paul sets up a network of new communities that undermine imperial power throughout
the eastern Mediterranean. To examine this, we will first look at some of the language that Paul
uses throughout his epistles that accomplish this, and then examine how those concepts work out
in specific contexts.
Paul’s language consists of many terms that were used heavily in imperial contexts. One
of these is the Greek term euangelion, from which are derived evangel and its cognates,
commonly translated as gospel. Evangelion was a politically fraught term for Paul to have used.
This gospel would have been brought along by a messenger to various cities, bringing the good
news of a grand imperial victory securing peace and security somewhere else in the empire. As
Neil Elliott writes, these “aspects of Paul’s theology echo the poetry and propaganda of the
Augustan and Neronian eras. […] By specifying that he proclaims Jesus as “the son of God”[…]
Paul implicitly parodies the theological claims made on behalf of the Julio-Claudian dynasty”
(Elliott, “Paul and the Politics” 24-5). Paul, by way of using this terminology, points to an
apparent showdown between Caesar and Christ for supremacy. This is something that N. T.
Wright places within Paul’s context as a first century Jew:
For Paul “the gospel” is the announcement that the crucified and risen Jesus of Nazareth
is Israel’s Messiah and the world’s Lord. It is, in other words, the thoroughly Jewish
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(and indeed Isaianic) message that challenges the royal and imperial messages abroad in
Paul’s world. [For Paul…] Theologically, it belongs completely with Isaiah’s ringing
monotheistic affirmations that YHWH and YHWH alone is the true god, the only creater, the
only sovereign of the world [… .] Politically, it cannot but have been heard as a summons
to allegiance to “another king,” which is of course precisely what Luke says Paul was
accused of saying (Acts 17:7). Pratically, this means that Paul, in preaching the gospel,
was more like a royal herald than a religious preacher or theological teacher. (“Paul’s
Gospel” 165)
Paul’s pronunciation then is in line with Jewish condemnations of imperial power, which seem to
find their largest target in Rome.
This itself is mixed up with various terms for the man the evangelion would have been
about: namely the soter or kyrios, the savior or lord. Here again explains Elliott in Roman
context: “Paul’s proclamation of Jesus as kyrios, the ‘lord of God’s empire,’ relied heavily on
Roman political concepts, and could ‘easily be understood as violating the ‘decrees of Caesar’ in
the most blatant manner” (“Paul and the Politics” 25). This indeed clashes with the supposed
divinity of Caesar, given the meaning of kyrios in the wider Jewish tradition: it was the word
used in the Septuagint (as in English bibles today) used to translate the tetragrammaton, the four
Hebrew letters YHWH (Wright, Paul 73). Caesar was the lord of his empire and the savior of
those who were in distress, both concepts that the language used by Paul challenge. This
salvation that the savior brought was tied up with the ideas of peace and security made popular in
the pax Romana. Indeed, “ ‘peace and security’ is in fact almost a definition of the Romans’
sōtēria, salvation. It functions as a kind of global protection racket. And Paul mocks it. It’s a
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hollow sham. What’s more, at the very moment when they make the claim most strongly, then
the destruction will come” (Wright 74). Paul critiques then the basis of Roman peace and
security not only on the basis of arrogance but on the basis of its vaporous quality.
What then is the victorious message that Paul preaches? The answer to this question is
the crucified Jesus, the public portrayal of which was the subject of his entire ministry (Galatians
3:1). Crucifixion was the ultimate signal of defeat that Rome placed on those who would rebel
against it. This was a punishment only deserved by slaves, something that Roman citizens could
only experience upon conviction of treason (Elliott “Anti-Imperial” 169). This is, notes Elliott,
not for Paul
an instance of official misconduct, a miscarriage of Roman justice. It is an apocalyptic
event. It reveals ‘the rulers of this age,’ indeed ‘every rule and authority and power’ –
procurators, kings, emperors, as well as the supernatural ‘powers’ who stand behind
them, as intractably hostile to God and as doomed to be destroyed by the Messiah at ‘the
end.’ Jesus’ crucifixion ‘is the crux of God’s plan for unmasking and overthrowing the
powers of this world’ (Elliot 176).
What was famously the last straw for rebellion somehow becomes a symbol of victory. This was
not accidental, as Wright explains:
We are here witnessing the rebirth of a symbol. The cross […] was already a powerful
symbol in the ancient world. It spoke both of politics (the unstoppable military might of
Rome) and of theology (the divinity of Caesar, whose power stood behind that of his
armies). The early Christian use of the cross as a symbol was not simply a creation out of
nothing. It took genius to see that the symbol which had spoken of Caesar’s naked might
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now spoke of God’s naked love. And I think that the genius in question belonged to
Paul. (Paul 73)
This then is the good news that Paul spread around the Mediterranean: that the powers that made
claim to the world’s loyalty and submission were ultimately illegitimate; that the true savior of
the world had come and lived as a man in Jerusalem; and that he was crucified by the authorities,
in a display of the world system’s violence as it slew an innocent man, and a display of God’s
mercy in finally sending the promised Messiah to Israel.
Paul brought this message to many of the important cities of the Eastern Roman empire,
establishing alternative communities in places even where the imperial cult was simultaneously
flourishing. For Paul, this took the shape of the ekklesia, the assembly, from which are derived
words like ecclesiastical. This is a term with an ancient heritage, being used even back to the
high days of Athenian democracy. For Greeks, the “primary meaning […] was the citizen
‘assembly’ of the Greek polis. Ekklesia is thus a political term with certain religious overtones”
(Horsley Paul and Empire 208). These communities would attempt to be alternate political
communities, where one’s citizenship was ultimately in heaven (Philippians 3:20), and where
virtues like love, patience, kindness, and gentleness could be practiced here and now (Galatians
5:22-3), in contrast to the vice and greed of imperial Rome. Besides this, “the alternative society
[…] is rooted in the history of Israel, in opposition to the pax Romana” (Horsley 209).
Assemblies that Paul plants then provide a perceived threat to the common culture shared by
subjects of Rome.
These ideas work themselves out numerous places within his letters. Philippians is a
good example of these working together. Philippi was, as Wright notes, a somewhat recently
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founded Roman colony, and its closeness with Rome meant that “they knew that if they were
ever in difficulties, they could call on the emperor to come from the mother city and rescue them,
because as savior and lord he had power to impose his will on the whole known world” (Paul
72). This is contrasted with the claims of Paul in 3:20: “But our citizenship is in heaven, and
from it we await a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ.” Wright offers commentary:
These are Caesar-titles. The whole verse says: Jesus is Lord, and Caesar isn’t. Caesar’s
empire, of which Philippi is a colonial outpost, is the parody; Jesus’ empire, of which the
Philippian church is a colonial outpost, is the reality. And the point of having
“citizenship in heaven” is not that one might eventually retire and go home to the mother
city […]. The point was that, if things were getting difficult in one’s colonial setting, the
emperor would come […] to rescue and liberate his loyal subjects. (“Paul’s Gospel” 1734)
The peace and security offered by Rome was a deception, claims Paul. Ultimately, this peace
and security could be gained only by allegiance to a different king who reigned in a different
kingdom.
Another of Paul’s letters to another Macedonian city directs his critique more pointedly
toward emperor worship itself. The letter of I Thessalonians is generally thought to be one of his
earliest, and Thessalonica was a particularly important city to the burgeoning worship of the
emperor in the Greek east. This worship transformed from a relatively early cult focusing on the
goddess Roma, which after Augustus culminated in the building of a fullblown temple to Caesar
(Donfried 218). The worship of “Augustus [as] ‘son of god’ is appointed and now is given
priority over other priesthoods” (218). Newly converted Christians in this city would have had a
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difficult time coping with the religious leanings of the city. Such is the case that some even
believe a minor persecution occurred in Thessalonica after Paul’s visit, the first to have occurred
in a gentile context (220).
Paul must then stress the need for hope in waiting for the appearance of Christ for
salvation. Here Paul uses another term popular in imperial language: parousia. In the Roman
world, this was a generally known event where the inhabitants of a city would come out to greet
and welcome in a visiting ruler. Paul encourages these inhabitants of Thessalonica to have hope
in this over against any trouble that may have been caused for them in the city. This is then the
same message found in Philippians: wait for the true emperor, who will truly bring peace and
security.
Yet the question must be raised: is this a constant element of Paul’s thought? The most
potent counterexample exists in a letter overwhelmingly accepted as genuine: Romans. Here
Paul seems to argue that the emperor has legitimate authority, that he does not wield his power
unjustly or in defiance of God’s dictates. This would seem to be directly contrary to all that has
previously been discussed here. If the empire of Caesar is a sham that perpetrates vast injustices
and serves as an arrogant affront to God, why is it to be obeyed? Indeed, how can it possibly be
referred to as a servant of God?
This is such that, as Elliott notes, “‘A persistent minority’ of scholars have rejected Rom.
13:1-7 as a non-Pauline interpolation into the letter” (“Romans 13:1-7” 184). Yet to believe thus
is to misunderstand the import of Paul’s politics. Paul is not an anarchist, and indeed is not even
against the Roman state in and of itself. Wright provides the best synopsis of Paul’s modus
operandi: “[Paul] is prepared to submit to the courts, but is also more than prepared to remind
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them of their business and to call them to account when they overstep their duty. He uses his
own Roman citizenship when it suits the demands of his mission. But at the same time he is
fearless in announcing, and living by, a different allegiance” (“Gospel and Empire” 70). Paul’s
ideology is hardly capable of overthrowing the state, or even the day-to-day operations of the
Roman state, in a day. Indeed, he would not want to do that, for to do so would plunge the world
into chaotic strife. Whatever the lies that surround it, imperialism does have a kernel of truth:
unruled men will tend to be unruly.
Paul’s political side is best summed up thusly: Paul’s problem with Rome is not its
imperial rule in and of itself, but rather the ideology that surrounds it. This ideology ensconces
itself in arrogance and hubristic pride, covering over the greed and envy that support the regime.
Paul’s problem is then that Rome does not behave as it should, operating in concert with the
dictates of his humane religion. For Rome, religion and the state were synonymous. In Paul, we
begin to see this differentiation between state and religion that will be so important to the history
of the West. Ultimately the state has the authority to wield the sword and execute justice, as Paul
says in Romans 13, but it does not have the authority to execute justice unjustly, nor to think
itself the sole purpose of human life. The state must then operate knowing it is not an
eschatological entity, but only a temporal one. Paul provides the basis of a sacred/secular divide.
AUGUSTINE AND THE CITY OF GOD
While Paul’s writings inform a nascent, unorganized Christianity that would take many
years yet to grow through the wide geography of the empire and the official persecutions various
emperors would institute, Augustine presents a political vision after the religion had coalesced
into dogmatic maturity. Augustine’s context is about as different from Paul’s as can be
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imagined. Though the empire in question is the same, the emperor is Christian, the official
religion Christianity, and the capital’s power has been split between Rome and Constantinople.
The beginnings of the religion in Paul and the apostles have hardened into dogma supported by
councils that crafted intricate theological definitions to protect against perceived heresies.
Within Paul’s time the greatest theological question seems to have been the role of gentiles in a
Jewish way of life; now truth hangs in the balance over an iota, such as in the Athanasian
controversy over homooúsios versus homoioúsios. Augustine is able then, according to Alasdair
MacIntyre, to elucidate Paul “in that he is able to give an account of Paul’s doctrine in Romans,
for example, using a vocabulary of a kind which was not available to Paul himself. In so doing
there is no doubt that he captures Paul’s meaning; it is not a mistake [for example] to impute to
Paul a conception of the will which he himself could not have spelled out” (157-8).
Yet Augustine’s time and context offers proof of the old adage that the more things
change the more they stay the same. Christianity had proven triumphant over Rome to a degree,
but Rome had fallen to Germanic barbarians in the sack by Alaric in 410. Certainly then,
declared the old guard religionists, Rome’s fall was attributable to the neglect of the old religion.
If Christ was the true god, why did the city fall? Certainly under Jupiter it would not have been
so. In short, though the ascendant religion’s position was more secure, Augustine found himself
in the same place as Paul, having to articulate an idea for a Rome that stood opposed to him.
Augustine accomplishes this in one of the great works of Western political philosophy De
Civitate Dei. In the City of God, Augustine manages to refute those Romans who would argue
against him, but more importantly rearticulates the Pauline political vision in a more philosophic
manner for the generations to come.
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Augustine begins his work with a short prologue discussing the purpose and method of
his work. His short-term purpose is to defend the city of God against those who would attack it,
namely those who would critique the Christian religion in the wake of Rome’s sack. Yet his
purpose is much more broad than that, for he seeks to create an apology for the city of God
throughout history, to, as Milton, “justify the ways of God to men” (4). He immediately
contrasts the two, one eternal yet with only fleeting glimpses gained within this life, the other
fleeting and temporal, yet easily apprehended. One has citizens who gain glimpses of it by faith
and live lives devoted to righteousness; the other is governed by arrogance, such that it would
claim to do things only properly left to God’s prerogative, as Augustine contrasts the verse of
Virgil on showing mercy to the humble and crushing the proud with that of James and Peter.
Ultimately though, Augustine points to the idea so prevalent in his work that the city of man is
does not rule itself but is ruled by its “lust of rule” (3).
What proceeds is a critique both of empire itself and of the Roman empire in particular.
Rome, it would seem, serves as the archetypical imperial power, displaying most prominently its
glaring vices and admirable virtues as few other empires could claim to do. Yet this is the
contradiction within Rome that is so important to understand. Rome has glaring pretentions that
it is better than the rest of the kingdoms of the world, that it, as Augustine quotes Sallust, prefers
“to spare the vanquished and subdue the proud [and] rather to forgive than to avenge an injury.”
The contradiction lies in the fact that though the Romans maintained this pretention, they still
took numerous cities in conquest just as the rest of the kingdoms of the world did and have done
throughout the ages (8). Rome considers itself unique and exceptional, but in consideration of its
day-to-day actions it is just like any other kingdom or principality.
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Augustine critiques even the Roman desire for peace as such, in words that could easily
have applied to the pax Romana as much as the loss of peace after Alaric. He censors the
Romans because their desire for peace and its accompaniments is “not prompted by any purpose
of using these blessings honestly, that is to say, with moderation, sobriety, temperance, and
piety; for your purpose is rather to run riot in an endless variety of sottish pleasures, and thus to
generate from your prosperity a moral pestilence which will prove a thousandfold more
disastrous than the fiercest enemies” (35). In short, the pagans desire peace not for peace but for
violence: “what you desire in the restoration of a peaceful and secure state, is not the tranquility
of the commonwealth, but the impunity of your own vicious luxury” (37). Romans desire a
powerful state capable of ensuring peace so that they may avoid the difficulties of a virtuous life.
These critiques all occur in book one, and will serve as the two pillars, often again
constructed, upon which Augustine will base the entirety of his critique: the paradox of Rome’s
supposed exceptional status and the moral bankruptcy of the empire. In order to do this,
Augustine will take a huge number of pages attempting to tell a typological history of the two
cities, comparing and contrasting them through various important events and figures (O’Daly
81). Augustine over and again presents both the virtue and vice of Rome, which both appear to
be great to him. Yet the problem remains for the vast majority of Roman virtue: even the justice
that Rome appears to exercise is motivated by evil, prideful desires, something that undercuts the
claims to justice (MacIntyre 155). Unjust motivation destroys justice, making the state itself
unjust, according even to Cicero, in one of Augustine’s typical uses of ancient sources
(MacIntyre 155). Augustine’s use of Cicero in this way, along with Virgil, Sallust, and a myriad
of classical authors heightens the paradox: that Rome’s pretentions to unique status are wrong,
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yet Rome somehow legitimately has unique characteristics, unique in its virtue and in its vice,
deserving both admiration and contempt.
Augustine’s apology begins its more philosophic turn in book two. Augustine points out,
in echoes of Paul in Romans, that citizens of the heavenly city “are enjoined to endure this
earthly republic” (59) in hopes of reward from the other. Christians are then to live in
accordance with all virtue, following the law of the state where it does not contradict conscience.
This is contrasted with the pagans who “are nowise concerned that the republic be less depraved
and licentious. Only let it remain undefeated, they say, […] let it be glorious by its victories, or
still better, secure in peace […] this is our concern, that every man be able to increase his wealth
as to supply his daily prodigalities, and so that the powerful may subject the weak for their own
purposes” (59). Citizens of the city of God are then better citizens than those who only inhabit
the city of man, according to Augustine. Their ultimate disloyalty increases temporal loyalty to a
republic, as long as it is just.
Augustine proceeds to his most overtly political statements in book three. He provides a
potent critique of imperial ambition. This argument is based on the premise that it is better to be
small and of sound health than large and beset by many evils: “In this little world of man’s body,
is it not better to have a moderate stature, and health with it, than to attain the huge dimensions
of a giant by unnatural torments, and when you attain it to find no rest, but to be pained the more
in proportion to the size of your members?” (80). This Augustine ties in with a subtle critique of
the idea of defensive empire advocated by the Romans. Augustine admits that the Romans may
have a “plausible defence for undertaking and carrying on such disastrous wars – to wit, that the
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pressure of their enemies forced them to resist, so that they were compelled to fight […] by the
necessity of protecting life and liberty” (81).
The rejoinder is then easily made: “For even if then Rome was harassed by wars, and yet
did not meet force with force, the same means she then used to quiet her enemies without
conquering them in war, or terrifying them with the onset of battle, she might have used always,
and have reigned in peace with the gates of Janus shut” (81). This seems to be an appeal to
defensive strength rather than defensive imperialism. This is certainly something that a
moderate, virtuous citizenry could accomplish too, from something as small as Rome the citystate, or if Rome’s empire had stopped at any point in her conquests. The ability to peaceably
maintain strength is something difficult to do but yet not impossible, as perhaps the modern
example of the Swiss, who managed to avoid combat in both world wars, illustrates.
The violence that Rome projected to the world is not without basis within Rome itself,
though, as Rome was inherently violent. Augustine points to numerous events in Roman history,
beginning with the violent rape of the Sabines. Certainly the new Romans needed wives, but by
what means? – “with what wounds on both sides, and with what sad slaughter of relatives and
neighbours!” (83). Yet this will be the tone that Roman history sounds, as Rome is racked by
internal violence from the fratricidal Romulus to the numerous civil wars, culminating seemingly
in the unholy trinity of those between Caesar and Pompey, Antony and the Assassins, and
Antony and Octavian.
Whatever peace and joy, Augustine argues, can be found in empire is to “be compared to
glass in its fragile splendour, of which one is horrible afraid lest it should be suddenly broken
into pieces” (111). Wherefore it is asked: is it better to have great riches and wracked by
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constant violence or moderate and peaceful? Even more, is it better to be a good man and a
slave, or a free man enslaved to many vices? (112) The toil of immoderate empire and greed is
surely greater than anything moderation would ever produce, as Augustine seemingly echoes the
Aristotelian ethic of virtue being found in moderation. Indeed he sums up the section with the
story of Alexander and the pirate:
[It was] an apt and true reply which was given to Alexander the Great by a pirate who
had been seized. For when that king had asked the man what he meant by keeping hostile
possession of the sea, he answered with bold price, “What thou meanest by seizing the
whole earth; but because I do it with a petty ship, I am called a robber, whilst thou who
doest it with a great fleet are styled emperor.” (113)
It is better to be small and dwell among good neighbors than to trample down both your
neighbors and the weak of your own city in order to gain avarice-laden peace.
Augustine must however give an account of how Rome managed to gain so much
prestige while maintaining such vice. His original reader might ask then, why has God waited so
long to see Rome downfallen, considering the ubiquity of evil? Augustine maintains the virtue
of the republic, even pointing back to the oft quoted verse of the Aeneid, claiming that the
pretentions Rome maintained were “exercised with the more skill the less they gave themselves
up to pleasures,[…] amassing riches, and […] corrupting morals” (160). Indeed, he points back
to Cato as quoted by Sallust, which deserves quotation at length:
I do not think […] that it was by arms that our ancestors made the republic great from
being small. Had that been the case, the republic of our day would have been by far more
flourishing than that of their times, for the number of our allies and citizens is far greater;
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and, besides, we possess a far greater abundance of armour and of horses than they did.
But it was other things than these that made them great, and we have none of them:
industry at home, just government without, a mind free in deliberation, addicted neither
to crime nor to lust. Instead of these, we have luxury and avarice, poverty in the state,
opulence among citizens; we laud riches, we follow laziness ; there is no difference made
between the good and the bad; all the rewards of virtue are got possession of by intrigue.
And no wonder, when every individual consults only for his own good, when ye are the
slaves of pleasure at home, and, in public affairs, of money and favour no wonder that an
onslaught is made upon the unprotected republic. (161-2)
Augustine is ready to admit, in line with Cato, that while Rome was smaller and younger,
namely the infant republic, it displayed some degree of justice unknown, seemingly, in either its
birth or adulthood. Whatever the case, this is another example of the strange paradox that Rome
presents, as one cannot fully despise or esteem it.
The defense and explanation of the city of God is begun much later in the work. The
origins are rooted in the Genesis account, in the story of Cain and Abel, Cain the father of the
city of man, Abel of the city of God: “When these two cities began to run their course by a series
of deaths and births, the citizen of this world was first-born, and after him the stranger in this
world, the citizen of the city of God, predestinated by grace, elected by grace, by grace a stranger
below, and by grace a citizen above” (479). This contrast is made more explicit in the direct
comparison: “It is recorded of Cain that he built a city, but Abel, being a sojourner, built none.
For the city of the saints is above, although below it begets citizens, in whom it sojourns till the
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time of its reign arrives, when it shall gather together all in the day of the resurrection” (479).
Cain and Abel serve then as the prototype for the relationship between these two spheres of life.
The violence inherent in the fratricidal act of Cain, and the violence boasted of by his
ancestors like Lamech (Gen 4:23), becomes endemic of the city of man. It is constantly in
conflict, as conquerors are always attempting to bring peace by their conquest, but can never
finally accomplish it (481). Rome becomes archetypical of this, as, though neither can be
pointed to as a child of promise, Romulus and Remus stain its founding with the blood of
fratricide (483). The city of man is then doomed to continual conflict and strife, to conquer and
be conquered, to kill and be killed.
Yet in the midst of all this, a solution is offered approaching something Pauline.
Augustine recognizes that the purpose of all these wars is peace, though a peace which is both
vaporous and fraught with dangers. Peace after conquering can bring pride, then making victory
“life-destroying,” or it can be short lived. “But the things this city desires,” namely peace,
“cannot justly be said to be evil, for it is itself, in its own kind, better than all other human good”
(481). He continues:
These things, then, are good things, and without a doubt the gifts of God. But if they
neglect the better things of the heavenly city, which are secured by eternal victory and
peace never-ending, and so inordinately covet these present good things that they believe
them to be the only desirable things, or love them better than those things which are
believed to be better – if this be so, then it is necessary that misery follow and ever
increase. (482)
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The answer then is that if the state pursues good things wrongly or for the wrong reasons, if the
state pursues peace in a manner fundamentally unpeaceful, if it pursues justice unjustly, if it
pursues prosperity greedily, it cannot be said to prosper. If it is wracked by pride and hubris, not
submitting itself under ultimate claims that it does not control, it will be an evil state. If the state
is the end of history and the goal of mankind, then it cannot help but be an unjust state.
CONCLUSION
Paul and Augustine set up a system of what will come to be called church and state
which, if nothing else, serves as a check on the power of the state and imperial ambition. This
indeed would anecdotally be the condition of the Medieval and Renaissance West, though of
course it may be argued that at times during this period the pendulum swung to the other
direction and the Church possessed undue authority over the state. Whatever the case is,
Christianity manages to break the stranglehold the Roman state had on ideological belief that
supported and legitimated the illegitimate authority it attempted to wield in its empire.
Augustine’s political influence will be felt for some time, although the seeming complete
abandonment of it is the subject of my next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: AMERICAN APPLICATION
Comparisons between the Roman Empire and whatever burgeoning empire the United
States might hold today are rather common. And indeed there is a great deal of surface
similarity. Both were born out of the culture of their predecessor cultures – the Romans with the
Greeks, and the Americans with the Europeans – and both stepped into the power vacuum that
was left after they had torn themselves apart by internecine warfare, such as the aftereffects of
Alexander’s conquest or the conflagration of the great wars of the twentieth century. Whatever
physical similarities exist though, it must be ultimately admitted that the correspondence is not
one-to-one. The United States does not have the direct governing power over the far reaches of
the world that Rome maintained through her empire, at least not yet.
What comparison bears the most fruit is the ideological one, the one that I seek to draw
out. Just as Rome saw herself as an exceptional nation with a vocation to spread civilization
around the world, so does the United States see itself as an exceptional nation that has a vocation
to spread the new bywords of civilization, freedom and democracy, to the four corners of the
world. Just as Rome consolidated her religion and state into one entity, breaching the separation
that Augustine would claim should naturally exist, so the United States has done, or has begun to
do. America’s conception of itself is perilously close to Rome’s, especially in the context of how
the sources I have presented here critique Rome. This, then, is the cause and goal of this
critique. In order to show the similarities, I will approach American ideology and history in two
distinct phases. The first will lay the bedrock for the second, as much of the ideology from the
colonial and revolutionary periods seems to have remained unrealized, at least in the form that it

54

would take in the twentieth and is taking in the early twenty first centuries. The second will look
at the period in the wake of the Civil War, but especially in the wake of World War One, and the
way that America’s ideological conception of itself in the world has worked its way into the
world at large.
FOUNDATIONS: ISOLATIONIST EXCEPTIONALISM
America, as G. K. Chesterton has famously observed, is a “nation with the soul of a
church,” (45) a singular nation founded not upon common identity but a creed. Indeed, for
Chesterton, this creed is expressed in the Declaration of Independence, something that, he writes,
“is set forth with dogmatic and even theological lucidity,” and the basis of the American
Constitution (41). Chesterton made this observation upon his first visit to the United States in the
early twentieth century. It contained a great deal of truth then, as the whimsical Englishman
observed America and reflected upon its past, and perhaps bears even more truth since the
passing of Chesterton’s Victorian Age.
Chesterton observed the symbiotic relationship between religion and politics in America
that had taken a completely different turn then that of Europe. “The crucial change came,” as
writes Ernest Lee Tuveson, “with the reversal of the Augustinian interpretation of history, which
had prevailed during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance” (viii-ix). While a great deal of this
Augustinian historical and political arrangement that I have shown previously began to topple in
Europe during the Reformation and Enlightenment, as European history and politics began to
become more tied to the Hobbesian sovereign instead of the Holy Father, formally the different
spheres were maintained, whether in Catholic France or Lutheran Germany. Though the prince
was sovereign, he had to at least pay deference to another power. Augustine’s influence in these
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matters seems, however, to have been completely lost in Puritan America following the
theocratic impulse of the Protestant Reformation, as church and state were often conflated into
one entity, as even de Tocqueville recognizes as late as the early 1800s: “Puritanism […] was
almost as much a political theory as it was a religious doctrine” (39).
During this early period of American history, roughly the colonial to the dawn of the
twentieth century, the isolationist impulse of American exceptionalism reigned, a side of the
ideology quite different from that of the post-world war period. In many ways, this was due to
the nature of the American experiment as it began. Many of the first Europeans to come to the
New World were religious exiles, seeking an escape from the political and religious turmoil on
the continent that had for so long engulfed it in wars that brought about the modern nation-state
and, in the protestant countries at least, their corresponding state churches. This was certainly
the impulse in two of America’s most famous colonial experiences, that of the Plymouth Colony
and the Massachusetts Bay Colony, the examples of which show an ideal that will become more
important in later American history.
COLONIAL
John Winthrop was a leader of that Massachusetts Bay Colony, one of the many Puritans
who came to the new colonies escaping the perceived tyranny of the Church of England. In
Winthrop and his community, one can easily see themes that will reemerge again and again in
American thought and history. Winthrop famously declares that their new political experiment
will be as a “citty upon a hill” (43), but the context of this declaration is tremendously important.
For Winthrop, this was an essentially democratic attempt at self-governance. This is due
to a theological claim that God, “this great King will have many Stewards, counting himselfe
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more honoured in dispenceing his gifts to man by man, than if hee did it by his owne immediate
hand” (39). This is ultimately the democratic priesthood of Luther and the Reformers, as much
as the Reformation destroyed the theoretical distinction between clergy and laity, writ upon the
political sphere. The Puritan community would seek to have tyranny neither from pope nor king.
In order to complete this democratization of government, it was extended to be “Government
both civill and ecclesiasticall” (41). In the Puritan attempt, church and state were one, as the
same authorities that would govern the populace in temporal matters would govern it in those
eternal. “Thus,” observes Sidney Mead, “the gathered church was co-extensive with the actual
state, the laws of which, it was supposed, coincided with the laws of God” (267).
The famous city on a hill remark is often called upon to highlight this early feeling of
divine vocation in the Puritan establishments, as a recalling of Jesus’ words speaking of a city
upon a hill that shall not be hidden (Matt. 5:14). Indeed this is the case, but with an important
distinction that will be lost in later American history. Winthrop recollects the history of Israel,
and ultimately draws the connection between this new chosen people and God’s chosen people
of old. This is a position fraught with danger for a number of reasons.
First of all, Winthrop reminds his community that “wee must Consider that […] the eies
of all people are upon us; soe that if wee shall deale falsely with our god in this worke wee have
undertaken and soe cause him to withdrawe his present help from us, wee shall shame the faces
of many of gods worthy servants, and cause theire prayers to be turned into Cursses upon us”
(43). Within Winthrop’s framework, sin is continually crouching at the door looking to devour
(Gen. 4:6-7), and the curses placed in the law of Israel are just as present as the blessings and just
as much a threat for the Puritan community as they were for the wilderness generation. As Ross
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Douthat says with different emphasis, “‘The flip side of the boast of Excpetionalism was a
warning’- a caution against arrogance and folly, lest America follow the path of “Israel and
Judah and Athens and Rome’ and succumb ‘to decadence, hubris, even self-hatred, and enter its
decline and fall’” (251).
Yet this postmillennial framework, thinking that God was in their community doing a
fundamentally new work to usher in a new age for mankind, is certainly present within this
theological hermeneutic. Perhaps no better example exists of this thought than in Jonathan
Edwards. This is seen clearly in Edwards’ published sermon “The Latter-Day Glory is Probably
to Begin in America.” In it, Edwards lays out his expectation that the great revival he was
witnessing, now known to history as the First Great Awakening, would bring in the millennium
and bring to bear the kingdom of God. As he says,
If we consider how long since the things foretold as what should precede this great event,
have been accomplished; and how long this event has been expected by the church of
God, and thought to be nigh by the most eminent men of God, in the church; and withal
consider what the state of things is now, and for a considerable time been, in the church
of God, and the world of mankind; we cannot reasonably think otherwise, than that the
beginning of this great work of God must be near. And there are many things that make
it probable that this work will begin in America[.] (55)
In order to prove this thesis, Edwards recalls many biblical prophecies that point to this new
order being established in a far off land. This culminates in the observation that the new world
had been left hitherto as though uncreated, a dark expanse perhaps with only the Spirit hovering
over the waters, “wholly the possession of Satan, the church of God having never been in it”
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(56). This is the foundation of Edwards’ hope: that now that this land has been established and
inhabited by Christian men, “God might in it begin a new world in a spiritual respect, when he
creates the new heavens and new earth” (56).
Ultimately though he goes to what will become a reoccurring theme in American
ideology: the corruption of Europe. For Edwards, the old world represents the elder brother of
the biblical motif, and the younger brother of America the child of promise. He writes:
The old continent has been the source and original of mankind in several respects. The
first parents of mankind dwelt there; and there dwelt Noah and his sons; there the second
Adam was born, and crucified, and raised again: And it is probably that, in some measure
to balance these things, the most glorious renovation of the world shall originate from the
new continent. (57).
Edwards even gives credit for the crucifixion to European civilization at large in this section,
seemingly in a deviation from the all too common anti-Semitism of the Continent. But in this
respect, Edwards seems to make the crucifixion not as much a crime as an unfortunate necessity,
seemingly drawing upon the story of David and Solomon, where David wished to build the
temple but was prohibited from doing so because of the blood upon his hands. This is not
explicit in Edwards, but seems to lurk behind, influencing him when he says, “Inasmuch as that
Continent has crucified Christ, they shall not have the honour of communicating religion in its
most glorious state to us, but we to them” (57). The religion that was carried over will be
brought back; the new world will have to reevangelize the old.
Edwards and Winthrop serve as examples of this idea that appears as at least a forerunner
to the idea of American exceptionalism. Both are convinced that in the founding of the
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American Colonies, God is accomplishing a novel work that will bring to fruition his kingdom.
This was married to the ability to rapidly expand that could solve all problems for the colonials,
as William A. Williams writes: “From the outset, […] colonial Americans had viewed the
acquisition of more land as a primary way of solving their problems and fulfilling their purposes.
That perpetual force for expansion (along with a more narrow possessiveness) contributed much
to the campaign to drive the Indians ever further west” (23). These ideas combined would lead
to an ever-present drive into the wilderness of the west, bringing civilization to the wilderness
whether through evangelism or war, a drive west many know by the name of Manifest Destiny.
REVOLUTION
Yet before this drive west would occur in force, the nature of this new American state
and its separation from the Old World would have to be achieved. Ultimately, this decision
would be made in the American Revolution and the following foundation of the new country, a
time during which many of the ideas already presented were crystallized into dogma with nearly
official status. During this time, much of the ideology of the early American Puritans would be
brought from New England to the nation as a whole and tied to the emerging nation without a
national church, attaching much of the devotion previously reserved for the church to the state
itself. In so doing, the Revolutionary generation severed the doctrine of American
Exceptionalism from the critique present within Puritan thought, leaving it open to dangerous
abuse in future generations.
Much as the United States could come forth as the first country, born of a Protestantism
without a history of establishment Christianity, so could it come forth as the first country
founded on Enlightenment principles through the first modern revolution. In step with the
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Enlightenment’s principles of reason and empiricism, the Founders ultimately sought to order the
new United States through a Constitution that, contrary to the wishes of many in their time,
omitted mention of God. Debates raged and continue to rage over whether in so doing the
Founders intended to create a secular republic or, under the ideal of federalism, to leave the
question of religion to the states (Fea 150). Given the context of the time, the latter seems very
likely: most of the new states had established churches. Ultimately, however, the Constitution
takes a something of a deistic or secular stance for the nation as a whole. One must realize that
this fact might not have meant much, given that debates still occurred between federalists and
anti-federalists, but nonetheless the foundation was laid for more developments to come.
In uniting the nation this way though, something in common had to be found to which all
Americans could subscribe, at least in theory. In this time, the beginning of an American civil
religion is seen. Though not necessarily something held by the general public, the Founders
maintained this in common, writes Sidney Mead, interspersed with quotes from Chesterton:
The “deism” exhibited in the Declaration was a positive religious teaching with […] a
lucid and even dogmatic theology. It was a cosmopolitan, inclusive, universal theology.
The founders, typical eighteenth century intellectuals oriented to the actualities of the
American scene, were cosmopolitans nationally and religiously. They were
cosmopolitans nationally in the since that Franklin meant when he said, ‘…. a
Philosopher may set his foot on [the world’s] surface, and say, ‘this is my country.’ So
such a Philosopher might have entered any church, as Franklin symbolically did by
contributing his mite to each, and declare, “This is my church.” (270)
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Though the general population probably would not have agreed with this sentiment to a man, this
dogma was necessary in order to unite the diverse population of the new nation.
Indeed, how could it be otherwise? In attempting to unite these thirteen colonies into a
new United States, the Founders sought to unite peoples as diverse as Congregationalists in
Massachusetts, Catholics in Maryland, Episcopalians in Virginia, Methodists and Baptists in
Georgia, complete with the Quakers, Unitarians, and any number of other denominations that
made up the religious scene of the emerging United States. Besides this, there were the various
nationalities of immigrants, the growing divide between North and South over the issue of
slavery and their radically divergent ways of life, and the host of other problems that any other
nation would have to deal with. Whatever the result, the problems encountered by the Founding
generation do appear exceptional; few countries are founded out of a situation such as this. The
result of this dilemma was to seek, as Mead terms it, a “synergistic core, [the conception of
which] enabled them to distinguish between the substance of religion, and the forms of the
religious sects exemplified in sectarian tenants and observances” (270). Whether one agrees that
this is virtuous or at all possible, this appears to be the method used by the Founders in creating
union from these radically disparate parts.
These foundations of an American religion, as Robert Bellah will later call it in
references to 1960s America, played an interesting role for the American people, and one that
would increase in the years to come. Paul Kahn, Professor at Yale Law, makes the observation
that the modern “state creates and maintains its own sacred space and history,” that the modern
state must have a political theology (19). As much as the United States is an archetypical
modern state, this certainly remains true. He continues:
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Freeing the state from the church did not banish the sacred from the political. It might
have, but it did not. The French revolutionaries attacked the church, but they found it
necessary to invent their own rituals of the sacred. […] The American Revolution
practiced the same double forms of the sacred, worshiping “self-evident truths” set forth
in the name of “We the People.” The framers separated church and state but spoke the
language of the sacred when pledging their lives to each other in their revolutionary
mission. (21)
Though not necessarily incarnated in the practice of the average Georgian or New Yorker of the
day, this religious core serves as the foundational idea behind the Declaration and the
Constitution, the documents that serve to provide the legal and spiritual basis between the
diverse people of the nation to this day.
This was the role of the sacred symbols of the revolution and the new country. The
Constitution and Declaration’s role in founding the nation have already been discussed, but as
Catherine Albanese points out, they both
quickly assumed the aura of sacrality which that understanding elicited. These
documents, fusing event with memoralization, pointed to a human past grounded on
human acts rather than either divine events in the lives of the gods or divine events
occasioned by a God who acted in history. The twin texts bent their Christian past to an
affirmation of the novus ordo saeclorum in which the novelty came from the primacy of
human action. (184)
Both of these documents existed as a written testimony to the particular toil of their framers.
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Yet the founding generation also produced a hero who typified all the virtues that the new
Americans wished to encourage and esteem. This man was George Washington, who rose even
into near veneration even within his lifetime. Washington was, according to Albanese, the
“collective representation of American personhood, […] a kind of superbeing who summarized
the ideals of character and consciousness which patriots together understood as best, in the old
Greek sense of arete” (144). Washington then serves as almost a hybrid of Romulus and
Aeneas, accomplishing the founding act like Romulus, though possessing of abounding virtue in
politics and war, like Aeneas.
Albanese speaks at length of the unique quality of Americans feeling the need to point to
one founder. She writes:
Thus, George Washington, founder, was a curious anomaly in at least one respect: other
time sand other places had seen only founded religions with founders. Now though, a
founder would be linked by popular acclaim to an act of mythic foundation and a sacred
story of origins, historicized and self-conscious, yet, paradoxically, to a large extend
unconscious of its religious import. […] Yet, in the subtle democracy of myth, when
Americans acknowledged that George Washington had founded their nation, in effect
they were saying that they had founded themselves. (146)
Hardly could a better example of the emerging American civil religion be found than this. In the
founding, Americans looked to a single individual to typify their experience and provide an
example for living, not only Aeneas but Christlike. Washington and the founding documents
belong to a mythic and removed age, revered like the age of Troy from which came not only
Aeneas, but virtuous Hector and wily Odysseus. Yet these documents were by the people, and
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Washington though extraordinary was also just an ordinary citizen, a first among equals. By
doing so, the new myths simultaneously draw on the American desire for democracy and the
need for sacred images to unite the American people: the true revolution.
This new civil religion even in its infancy served to unite the nation in ways never dreamt
of in old Europe. Stanley Hauerwas explains, “The development of a common civil religion […]
allowed Americans, as well as immigrants in America, to understand their faiths as contributing
to a consensus summed up by the motto ‘E pluribus unum.’ This is in marked contrast to Europe,
where religious identities have been the source of division [. …] In America, religious
difference, which is even more varied than in Europe, is subordinated to “one nation under God”
(3-4). Here then, to echo the words of Peter, is a holy nation, a new people that were once not a
people, made up of every nation on earth.
THE INTERLUDE
In any attempt to construct an understanding of the history of the United States, it would
often seem foolish to summarily deal with the nineteenth century. Yet this is what I intend to do
here, in concluding this early period of American history. In many ways, this period continued
many of the trends began in the Revolutionary period, though it exposed a glaring weakness in
the system that the Founders designed.
During this period, the process of expansion proceeded quickly, with large acquisitions
from France and Britain, and a war with Mexico. This is also the period of the Monroe Doctrine,
where the United States staked its isolationist claim in a more expansive manner, largely
prohibiting European powers from meddling in the western hemisphere. This combined with the
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spirit of Manifest Destiny, the idea giving justification for westward expansion that, claims
Williams,
Symbolized the assertion that God was on America’s side rather than the more modest
claim that the country had joined the legions of the Lord. As that logic implied, the
argument was that America was the “most progressive” society whose citizen made
“proper use of the soil.” For these and similar reasons, it was added, the laws of “political
gravitation would bring many minor peoples into the American system. (60)
This spirit allowed Americans to push Indians off the land through forceful methods, and also
gave the Americans “responsibility to extend its authority over ‘semi-barbarous people,’” a
phrase used to justify the Mexican-American War in the mid-1840s (60).
This period also brought a major theological change to the character of the nation. The
Second Great Awakening brought a plethora of new revivals, though this was one of the few
things that it had in common with the first. Characterized by people like Charles Finney, this
awakening brought a new theology to counter the old Calvinism of the Puritans: that of
Arminianism. Whereas before Calvinism provided a strong emphasis on original sin and a
strong divine hand to determine the affairs of men, contributing some possible critique to the
growing ambition of the republic, the Arminian vision downplayed sin, especially on a societal
level, and preached “one only had to will [to] change and make a determined effort to reform
one’s life” (Hughes 154), the perfect theology for the archetypical can-do American spirit.
Ultimately however, this period shows the glaring weakness of the Constitutional
creation by the Founders: it fails if people do not believe in it, or at least in the established
interpretation of it. Such was the case in the break up that occurred during the Civil War, where
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the moral issue of slavery and the constitutional issue of federalism were up for grabs. Due to
the sacred nature of the Constitution, the American Civil War appears not just as a civil war
between opposing sides in a nation state, but as a war of religion – a theological crisis, to use
Mark Noll’s phrase. Noll contests that the Civil War was a theological crisis in that it was
fundamentally a clash over “interpretations of God’s written Word, the Scriptures” (7). The
division was great during this time, such that Lincoln could hold up the paradox in his Second
Inaugural Address that “both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes
His aid against the other” (196). Yet just as much as this it can be said that the war was over the
meaning of the Constitution, as indeed the still continuing debate over the role of states’ rights in
the war can attest. Though the Union won the war, it was won through bloody conquest: hardly a
conciliatory measure. The divide remained in Reconstruction, and at least temporarily it seems,
the spirit of unity within the nation was broken.
MODERN: IMPERIAL EXCEPTIONALISM
In order to reverse the damage done to the union during the Civil War and
Reconstruction, something would have to occur to rally the nation together, though in some ways
the United States was able to continue as before. The old ideas that spread the United States’
influence over the continent and barred European powers from their holdings in the Americas
came back with a vengeance in the Spanish-American War, where the US effectively asserted its
growing imperial power against that of a waning Spain. In the wake of this as well, the US was
able to gain its first overseas holding, and put down its first overseas colonial rebellion, in the
Philippine-American War.
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The divide within the nation had still not been bridged, though something was soon on
the horizon that would take strides toward that national healing and set the tone for the rest of
American history until contemporary times. This would come from Europe, in the event of the
First World War. This is an argument advanced by Stanley Hauerwas, who claims in reference
to the American religion, “War is America’s central liturgical act necessary to renew our sense
that we are a nation unlike other nations. World War I was the decisive moment because it was
that war that finally healed the wounds caused by the American Civil War” (4). World War I,
and America’s intervention in it, presents the moment when American destiny as it has come to
be in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries was seemingly inevitable, seen first in the
ideology of President Woodrow Wilson.
WILSON AND THE COSMOPOLITAN IMPULSE
Wilson’s gospel of a cosmopolitan, American Protestantism that would save the world
from the ills of Europe, what Ross Douthat calls “messianic Americanism,” begins now to be the
norm. As he writes, “Piggybacking on the parallels between American universalism and
Christian universalism, messianic Americanism turns liberal democracy into a religion unto
itself, capable of carrying out the kind of redemptive work that orthodoxy reserves for Christ and
his Church” (255). Late within World War I, however, the United States first received an
opportunity to exercise its messianic muscle, and Wilson took the first steps in creating a
cosmopolitan, internationally concerned America, radically opposed to any earlier pretenses of
isolationism.
After the United States steps into Europe’s great war, tipping the stalemated scales in
favor of the Allied Powers, Wilson was in a unique position to press America’s will in Europe.
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Wilson’s vision consisted, as Andrew Bacevich says, of “a world remade in America’s image
and therefore permanently at peace” (New American 10). This is the idealized America of the
Founders, creating a world devoted the ideals of freedom, democracy, and self-determination,
and not plagued by the scourge of internecine war.
Wilson’s vision was presented with incredible certainty and confidence. This was
encouraged by the perceived fact that “God Himself willed the universal embrace of American
principles” and that the United States had a role “in bringing history to its predetermined
destination” (11). Wilson then sought the end of history through military and diplomatic means,
as America found itself playing savior to a world besot by the sin of brother killing brother, one
apparently that America had been absolved from. Wilson’s tradition in its pretentions is
certainly an explicit rejection of Augustinianism, and displays what Reinhold Niebuhr calls the
prototypical modern “rejection of the Christian doctrine of original sin” (17). Here we catch the
first glimpse of America as the innocent nation, as Niebuhr will term it.
Yet this is somehow the role that the United States attempts to step into after World War
I. The United States knows the “direction in which history is headed,” and becomes, even to
Europe, the answer to Europe’s problems (Pfaff 10, 35). Wilsonianism is embraced in Europe
with great exuberance in the passing the Versailles Treaty and founding the League of Nations.
In these acts, Wilson attempts to redefine the old idea of Manifest Destiny. Partly this may be
due to the fact that the continent had been taken over and the American expansionist impulse
needed to be turned somewhere, but with Wilson, Manifest Destiny is released from its mission
to take over the continent and assumes an evangelistic mission to humanity.
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With Wilson, however, this is not a complete change. The presumed isolationist impulse
still maintained strength, and upon Wilson’s return from Europe the US did not join the League
of Nations and did not ratify the peace of Versailles. After the war, the pendulum swung back in
favor of isolationism, as the United States followed its traditional action of disbanding its
standing army when the threat was removed and keeping itself unstained from the evil of the
world. This goes back to the old tradition glimpsed in the first generations of colonials and
revolutionaries, and provides some justification for the idea that after the Great War the old
breaks were still maintained. It would take the work of another war and the emergence of a
perennial enemy to destroy this American hesitancy.
WORLD WAR II AND THE INNOCENT NATION
In World War II, the United States found its war to define its modern place in the world.
Though at first the isolationist impulse was strong enough to resist entry into another of Europe’s
wars, eventually fighting was seen as necessary in response to aggression in the Atlantic and
Pacific. This provided an easy entry into the war. In the Pacific, the United States could
definitively exercise its traditional naval might against an enemy that had attacked first at Pearl
Harbor. In Europe, however, the war was particularly ideological. Hitler’s Third Reich
presented a real and incarnated evil. Those that went off to war could, in a legitimate sense, be
said to have made “the world safe for democracy” in an age when “great evil and great good
faced each other” (Hughes 153). In World War II, there was something that needed to be saved,
and the United States stepped into the role of savoir.
At the end of the war the United States appeared solely triumphant, over not only its
enemies but also its allies. Germany had been crushed between the eastern and western front,
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and as a sovereign nation for some time ceased to exist. Britain and France, formerly the
strongest powers of Western Europe, were crushed from years of occupation or the bombs of the
Luftwaffe. The United States stood materially unscathed and economically strengthened, solely
able to stand against Stalin’s evil empire that took the place of Hitler’s. The world was left with
two superpowers that would trade blows throughout the world for much of the twentieth
century’s remainder.
This stand off provides the great paradox of a writer like Reinhold Niebuhr’s work.
Niebuhr emerged as the great advocate of Christian realism within Cold War America, providing
some glimpse at a possible critique, contrary to the constant trajectory of American civil religion.
But this was a fraught position, as he himself admits, for “these reservations of Christian realism
in our culture cannot obscure the fact that, next to the Russian pretentions, we are […] the most
innocent nation on earth” (23). This reflects the tension of great powers like the United States
and to a great extent of its predecessor Rome. Compared to German Nazism and Soviet
Communism, the United States was a source of great good in the world, and its power was
greatly necessary and beneficial. Yet devoid of the introspective ability to critique, of a
prophetic voice that can operate simultaneously from within the system and from outside it, this
is a situation fraught with danger. This is the warning of Niebuhr at the height of the Cold War:
Our moral perils are not those of conscious malice or the explicit lust for power. They
are the perils which can be understood only if we realize the ironic tendency of virtues to
turn into vices when too complacently relied upon; and of power to become vexatious if
the wisdom which directs it is trusted too confidently. The ironic elements in American
history can be overcome, in short, only if American idealism comes to terms with the
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limits of all human striving, the fragmentariness of all human wisdom, the precariousness
of all historic configurations of power, and the mixture of good and evil in all human
virtue. (133)
In this fight against evil, it becomes far too easy to confidently rest on our own virtue, uncritical
of our motives, and unable to see the vice within our own nation.
All of the aspects seem to combine during this time in American history to coalesce into
what Robert Bellah calls “the generalized religion of ‘the American Way of Life’” (168). To
illustrate this, Bellah quotes President Kennedy’s inaugural address, perhaps the iconic Cold War
president. Kennedy concludes his remarks with important language:
Finally, whether you are citizens of America or of the world, ask of us the same standards
of strength and sacrifice that we shall ask of you. With a good conscience our only sure
reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love,
asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God’s work must truly
be our own. (169, emphasis own)
Kennedy displays this final conflation of the aims of church and state, in this case the subsuming
of the goals of religion with those of politics. Whatever may be said about the goodness of
American aims and actions in the world during this time, this is the sin of idolatry in the JudeoChristian tradition, of hubris in the Greek. As Paul Kahn notes in reflection on the great wars of
the twentieth century, this century was by no means secular (Putting Liberalism 92). The United
States during this period is no exception.
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THE WAR ON EVIL
As the Soviet Empire came apart in the late 1980s, a new paradigm had been reached in
America’s role on the international stage. The United States emerged from the conflict with
Soviet Russia as the sole superpower, by many claims the new hyperpower. This was enough to
cause many to wax apocalyptic, a clear example of which is Francis Fukuyama’s infamous essay
“The End of History?” in which he suggests that the end of history is upon us, that liberal
democracy has emerged victorious with no political ideologies left that can challenge it an idea
even he since has reconsidered (n.pag). Even according to conservative columnist Ross Douthat,
Regan’s policies take the brakes off conservatism, depriving it of its natural tragic element that
could at least constrain the ambition of the state (267). Neoconservatism under Regan and his
followers deviates from the older, more isolationist conservatism, as it encourages the proactive
and extensive use of American power overseas. In this move it still maintains the American
exceptionalist rhetoric that encouraged isolationism, but uses it instead for a more imperialist
agenda, something largely unchallenged by the vast majority of American political participants.
Rhetoric on the new self-awareness of American’s role in the historical narrative abounds
during this time. Bill Clinton declared in the 90s that it was now apparent that America was on
the right side of history, sentiments echoed by Condoleezza Rice and Newt Gingrich on the right
(Bacevich, American Empire 32, 34, 51). This is something bipartisan on the modern American
political spectrum with Regan, two Bushes, Clinton, and Obama to back up the policy. Such is
the case that Bacevich writes, “When it comes to fundamentals undergirding U.S. foreign policy,
consensus reigns on all but the extreme left and right. That consensus is so deep-seated that its
terms have become all but self-evident, its premises asserted rather than demonstrated”

73

(American Empire 33). The American way of life was seen as triumphant, and nothing can argue
with this perceived victory.
Much of this is in opposition to a great deal of even recent history and tradition. Indeed,
American military might was seen to be cosmic justification for American exceptionalism: “The
providential judgment seems indisputable: the nation charged with the responsibility for guiding
history to its predetermined destination has been endowed with the raw power needed to do just
that” (Bacevich, New American 32). This in spite of the fact that the history of the twentieth
century with its empires that tried to reach to the heavens and destroyed themselves and their
neighbors in the process teaches one thing: that hubris leads to catastrophe (9). Yet this lesson is
forgotten, even in concert with forgetfulness about American traditions themselves. This is to
such an extent that George H. W. Bush could claim that the American tradition of isolationism
was the reason for the Pearl Harbor attacks (76). Instead, America exports violence to the four
corners of the earth, as its military actively seeks this end of history (Pfaff 86). Our militarism
makes us a people set apart, unconstrained by any history or limits (Bacevich, New American
34). America may be the end of history, but that history seems largely invented, while the actual
history of the world is forgotten, left irrelevant.
Religiously, this derailed American civil religion has co-opted the political expression of
much of American Christianity. Neoconservatism sees America as the one, catholic church, and
American messianism presents itself as the new ecumenical faith (Bacevich New American 78;
Douthat 261). Someone like Jerry Falwell can claim that “A political leader, as a minister of
God, is a revenger to execute wrath upon those who do evil. Our government has the right to use
its armaments to bring wrath upon those who would do evil by hurting other people” (qtd.
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Bacevich, New American 128-9). This is a largely alarming alliance between evangelical
Christianity and the powers that exist intent on spreading America’s hegemony around the world.
This is not a Christianity capable of providing a critique or prophetic voice to a nation
with as much power as the United States. This is not the Christian thought of Jesus, Paul, or
Augustine. In this combination the idea of just war is thrown off by simply saying that America
is good without critique; Nicea is thrown off simply by its denial of the real universal church,
and Romans 13 is carried to such tortured exegetical extremes that it hardly becomes
recognizable as part of Paul’s thought. America is politically, to use Ross Douthat’s phrasing, a
nation of heretics, and this loss of traditional Christianity in a nation with supposedly Christian
roots has led to a religious sphere that is impotent and a political one that is omnipotent.
Throughout the 1990s this led to a strange paradigm in American politics. The evil that
the nation fought was defeated, and nothing remained. Yet this was quickly replaced at the
beginning of the twenty-first century, with the attacks of September 11th. The military, never
having been disbanded in the wake of the Cold War, was unleashed against a completely nontraditional enemy. Yet for all the non-traditional status of the Taliban or al-Qaeda, what
becomes even more non-traditional in this war is its stated objective. The war that the United
States currently engages in is the War on Terror. This might as well be called a war on evil, a
war on death, or, to use more ancient language, a war on barbarism. This is ultimately a war on
an idea, an idea that has existed from the foundations of the world, an idea that has, throughout
much of history, been the domain of religion or philosophy, definitively not of the state.
Ultimately then, in the words of Stanley Hauerwas, “We got a ‘war against terrorism,’
which is a war without end” (19). This is an eschatological war. This is reflected in the original
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name of the War on Terror: “Operation Infinite Justice” (Hughes 156). While some may have
prematurely described the triumph of liberal democracy as the end of history, proponents of the
war on terror seeks to actively bring in the eschaton, the final realization of the kingdom of God,
and the millennium of peace. The current ideology in the United States results in an intrusion by
the state upon the realm of the church, of the secular upon the sacred. This is a breakdown in the
paradigm presented most strongly by Paul and Augustine that has dangerous results.
CONCLUSION
Whether the United States physically resembles the Roman Empire or not is ultimately
irrelevant because in many of the ideological ways that Christian thinkers critiqued Rome the
resemblance is uncanny. The United States perceives itself as a divinely called nation to spread
its version of civilization over the world in a hegemonic empire of influence. Indeed, it is very
possible that with the nature of communication and transportation in this age, this is preferable,
as it allows one to maintain the same powerful grip over far off lands in a manner that proves the
least dangerous for the mother country’s citizens. In addition, the US sees itself as holding the
keys to history, indeed, in many cases, as the final stage in that history. And though the
concentration of the sacred nature of the state has not brought itself to the divinization of one
man, the amount of adoration due the state in so many ways surpasses the natural bounds of
patriotism and love of one’s place. In many ways then, the United States has assumed the
ideological and theological mantel of the Roman Empire.
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CONCLUSION
The Roman gospel was thus: that the empire of Rome had come to bring peace and
prosperity to the world. All that Rome and Caesar required was submission to its dictates, its
laws, and its ideology. Caesar was lord, savior, protector, and a son of god. Indeed, the gods had
ordained Caesar and Rome’s place in the world, so to offer rebellion, whether violent or
ideological, was rebellion not only against Caesar but also against the natural order.
Yet for all its pomp, glory, and power, Rome was weak. A single individual could bring
it to its knees. Thus the crucifixion, not only of Jesus, but of any who could oppose it, including
small slave rebellions like that of Spartacus. Rome built its powerful empire on avarice, envy,
and intrigue. But it was vulnerable to a single martyr, to a single witness to the truth that its
power was transitory and its glory vaporous.
This is the Christian critique for which I have argued. Jesus, through his life and
message, shows the corruption of the kingdom of man and promotes a different lifestyle based
not on the envy and one-upmanship that characterized all kingdoms of men and perhaps Rome
particularly, but on love of God and love of neighbor. Jesus’ message was humility, not hubris;
generosity, not greed; peace, not strife. Yet in his message, he unmasked the illusionary power
of Rome and the kingdoms of man, and for it was silenced in a shameful death on a cross.
Paul would then pick this up, and point to the way that the cross destroyed the authority
of Rome, as Rome saw fit to execute a man unjustly. Paul then spread Jesus’ message from
Judea and Galilee throughout the Mediterranean world, setting up communities based on Jesus’
message that looked back to his blood shed as the foundation for a new humanity. In many
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ways, Paul’s success is immeasurable, as within a few hundred years even the emperor would
find it necessary to convert to the very influential religion, and one of the brightest philosophic
minds of the Western world would articulate his political vision in the paradigm of the two cities.
Augustine did this, but not to a world completely unfamiliar with this message, as Paul
was required to do. Augustine could write from the perspective of a Christianity triumphant,
now even holding political power. He then could articulate the basic political foundation of the
pre-modern period, where church and state exist alongside each other, ideally neither co-opting
the other’s natural power, but pushing each other to their independent missions: the state, of
ensuring temporal peace and justice, and the church, of ensuring eternal peace and justice, and
prophetically reminding the state of its transitory nature.
In many ways modernity breaks this ideal schema, but the greatest display of the break up
of the Augustinian ideal is in the United States. In the US, the earliest attempts at selfgovernment are attempts at theocracy, breaking down the Augustinian separation, given the
Puritan expectation of seeing God’s kingdom come to fruition in the New World. Yet this
theocratic impulse is flipped, as instead of the church subsuming the state, as the Puritans hoped,
the state subsumed the church into its nature, taking within itself claims to the sacred and to
ultimate meaning. Throughout early American history the full import of this is in many ways
held back, as the isolationist leanings of many keep the US from bringing its new gospel to the
entire world. But under the influence of Wilson, the great victory won in the Second World War,
and the necessity of vigilance against the Soviet Empire, American ideology becomes free of its
constraints and becomes a global, and cosmopolitan gospel, which it declares is good for all
people.
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Indeed, if anything the essential message in my work it is this: empires of the type of
Rome and America subsume the global nature of the message of a religion like Christianity.
Much of the New Testament points to this as the nature of the new church that was springing up.
The gospel as Paul saw it was for all peoples, nations, tribes, and tongues. The Church was to be
the undoing of Babel. This is the point of Luke’s Pentecost narrative in Acts 2: the Spirit comes
and allows the early apostles to speak in tongues that all can understand, reversing the curse of
confusion that Genesis says occurred at Babel. Throughout Paul’s epistles, this new gospel is of
unity, not based on the coercion of the state, but based on participation in the Spirit of God, in
the love of neighbor that was so key to Jesus message. If America is an empire like Rome, it is
because it has found a fundamental way to subvert this good news. In this thesis, I have offered
evidence of this assessment and pointed to some of the causes, yet much more is being and must
be done to explore the context and consequences of this.
Much of the response to this inquiry must, I feel, be done in the church, or more broadly
defined, the religious realm. A power like America, just as a power like Rome or any other great
empire, is unlikely to contribute to a discussion that puts reins on its power. In some ways, I have
pointed to this occurring, as some theological confluences come together in ways that attempt to
reframe the essential Christian message in ways that would have been more familiar to Paul or
Augustine. Postliberal theology is one of these streams, and the narrative theology of someone
like Stanley Hauerwas has been important to my understanding of this subject.
This is also because of the nature of the divide between the church and state that has
occurred within the United States from its founding until today. The city on a hill that the
Puritans sought was something simultaneously political and religious, where religion seems to
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have driven the politics. The subtle difference in American politics today is that while the ideal
American state is still simultaneously political and religious, the only side of this that is admitted
explicitly is the political, seemingly creating the necessity of the political subsuming the
religious sphere. The critique that I argue for here is a return to religion’s ability to critique
politics. It is a return to Augustine, but not to Winthrop or Edwards. Part of any way forward is
to realize that, and of course this opens up the door to more research into how these ideals
changed between my two points in history. Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin seem integral to this
conversation, no less than Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. In particular, it is my feeling that
research along these lines regarding Reformation political thought in particular would prove
fruitful, especially considering Calvin’s unique influence on early American religion in the
enduring example of theocratic Geneva.
The Christian religion itself has a power as well that has been subverted within an
American Christianity that has become too cozy with its relation to American displays of power,
and in many ways has become the legitimating factor in those displays. Ultimately, as Paul
Kahn, points out, Christianity has a power through its understanding of sacrifice: “The Western
state actually exists […] under the very real threat of Christian martyrdom: a threat to expose the
state and its claim to power as nothing at all. In the end, sacrifice is always stronger than
murder. The martyr wields a power to defeat his murderer, which cannot be answered on the
field of battle” (Putting Liberalism 82). This is language fraught with difficulty, and a call to
action on these lines is certainly not the vocation of an academic paper like this. Yet the power
of Christianity must be recovered, founded as it is on the fundamental martyrdom of Jesus and of
many members of his early church, and the unmasking of the power of the state that occurs in
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those deaths. Martin Luther King Jr. is an excellent example of this, as one whose message has
spread in increasing power since his unjust killing. The United States in its contemporary state
and in this respect is certainly different from Rome – the State itself is not in the habit of making
martyrs of its rivals.
Part of the recovery of this voice would mean going to the prophetic portions of the
Christian cannon that may offer insight into it. I have purposefully stayed away from these parts,
as the more descriptive expressions of Paul are easier to theorize with than the apocalypticism of
John or Isaiah. Yet the Jewish prophets and the message they brought to a community exiled
under the greatest empires history had yet seen must be important to this. So too can be the early
history of Israel – the stinging critique of anarchy in Judges, Samuel’s warnings against
monarchy, and the decline of the monarchy after David – all of these are essential to forming a
broader critique of the realm of politics. Christianity must again learn how to read its scriptures
politically, and not because the scriptures are only political, but because politics are necessary.
The religion is not platonic Gnosticism: it deals with the whole of man, and man is a political
animal as Aristotle famously said.
All of these things point to one thing: the western church must recover its prophetic
voice. The ability to call into question the power of the state is essential. But this is an
ecumenical and multireligious call as well. Whether Muslim or Jew, Protestant or Catholic,
Baptist or Presbyterian, all living within the West and indeed the world have an interest in
curtailing this ideological power. Ultimately Rome’s message of freedom creates bondage. True
temporal freedom can only be found when the political life of men is properly ordered, and for it
to be properly order the state cannot make claim on ultimate and final things.
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Finally, I write as a Christian, an American evangelical no less, who is pained by the way
that my brothers view politics. Politics is more than what Americans view as a simple right/left
dichotomy. History has not come to an end, and the American experiment is not the last word on
political arrangements. Ultimately, I argue that a reassessment of the classical, western, political
tradition beginning in Augustine (and even Paul) is necessary for the continued health and
prosperity of Western civilization, and a renewed understanding of the political message of the
Scriptures is necessary for the continued mission of the Church, and for the well being of the
United States and the other nations of the world.
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